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Abstract:  The Duomatic principle is a well established part of corporate 
law, enabling shareholders to informally but unanimously make decisions 
which bind the Company. It traces its history to some of the earliest cases of 
company law, and the most recent review of company law decided to leave 
it uncodified. The resulting flexibility has caused some uncertainty as to the 
precise ambit of this principle. The aim of this thesis is to establish how this 
principle should interact with modern corporate law, review the judicial 
history of this principle and provide a modern test for its application. In 
order to do so, it firstly reviews the background to the modern corporate 
form, to establish where this principle should fit into the modern decision 
making framework for a company. It then traces the history of the principle, 
from its origins in Salomon and partnership law to its modern day 
application, and compares the judicial treatment of this principle to the 
normative framework. It then develops the modern, practical test for 
judicial application of this principle: when the principle can apply, and who 
needs to do what to make it do so. However, this test seems unsatisfactory 
as on almost every subject there are cases that conflict with this general 
position: whilst a modern test can be constructed, there is no certainty that 
it will be followed. This thesis ultimately concludes that this principle is a 
subset of equity; a remedy that courts retain discretion to utilise should 
they see fit and so not one of objective verifiable application – a position 
which conflicts with the theoretical root of the principle and its apparent 
modern day application. 
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The purpose of this thesis is to analyse and evaluate the ability of 
shareholders to overcome infelicities of procedure and/or substance by 
acting unanimously and informally together. We will discuss how the law has 
facilitated this in practice, limitations upon it and circumstances in which it 
may be argued. This vague concept will be called the "Principle" throughout 
this thesis. 
 
It well established that “for nearly a century the unanimous assent of 
shareholders has held the status of an overriding authority, able to … 
validate almost any act within the capacity of the company”.1 In the case of 
Re Duomatic Ltd, Buckley J stated:  
“where it can be shown that all shareholders who have a right to 
attend and vote at a general meeting of the company assent to some 
matter which a general meeting of the company could carry into 
effect, that assent is as binding as a resolution in a general 
meeting.”2  
 
This has become known as the “Duomatic Principle”, but is merely the most 
famous manifestation of the Principle. Despite recommendation that this be 
codified to provide certainty as to its application,3 when the Companies Act 
2006 was implemented it was decided not to codify the Principle but instead 
maintain its flexibility of application. Various other common law provisions 
were codified at this time.  
 
Nevertheless, the Principle has been tested before the courts in numerous 
situations (in respect of the Companies Act 2006, the Companies Act 1985 
and previous Companies Acts), and apparent clarity over the situations in 
which it can be applied has emerged. 
 
                                                     
1 Ross Grantham, 'The Unanimous Consent Rule in Company Law' (1993) 52 The Cambridge 
Law Journal 245, 245 
2 In re Duomatic Ltd [1969] 2 Ch 365, 373  
3 Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report, the Company Law Review 
Steering Group, July 2001, URN 01/942 and URN 01/943 para 2.14 
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The Principle has been criticised as "a principle without form", whose 
flexibilities are also its weaknesses.4 It has also been argued that the 
Principle "sits uncomfortably alongside many of the central principles of 
company law".5 Courts have provided an apparent, consistent and object 
application of the Principle that appears to sit comfortably with the 
normative underpinnings of company law. However, it is argued that, when 
examined closely, there are many grey areas and uncertainties as to the 
application of the Principle, which leads to the conclusion that instead it is 
a tool of the court to achieve a just outcome. 
 
The Principle relates to corporate decision making. Accordingly, any 
examination of the Principle requires to explore the decision making 
framework of the modern company: particularly how decisions can be made 
and who they can be made by. Accordingly, Chapter 2.1.1 firstly analyses 
the origins of a modern company. By concentrating on separate legal 
personality, this thesis will show that the modern company (incorporated by 
registration) is in fact a hybrid of a partnership and a corporation given legal 
personality by statute.6 This dual nature creates an opportunity for different 
views of various elements of the modern corporate form, including from 
which sources modern company law draws to complete any normative gaps. 
Chapter 2.1.2 identifies and discusses the agency costs that arise from 
having a separate legal vehicle, whilst Chapter 2.1.3 discusses the options 
open to law to minimise, or preferably eliminate, such agency costs. 
 
Chapter 2.2 reviews theories of company law and concludes that a company 
should be run for its shareholders with maximum protections for third party 
creditors. Chapter 2.3 develops this analysis by examining which internal 
organ of the company should make decisions on behalf of the company. 
Having identified this should be a default rule in favour of directors, 
Chapter 2.4 discusses the level of formality of decision making that should 
                                                     
4 Jason Ellis, 'Unanimous consent of shareholders: a principle without form?' 2011 The 
Company Lawyer 260 
5 Grantham (n1) 271 
6 Prior to incorporation by registration, a specific act of Parliament or charter was required 
for incorporation. Any such historic entity will be referred to as a “Corporation” 
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be required and concludes that this, too, should be a default rule for 
formality which can be waived by the shareholders unless such rule is 
designed for the protection of third parties. Chapter 2.5 reviews how 
shareholders should make decisions. From these theoretical foundations this 
thesis draws a normative conclusion about how the Principle should operate 
in Chapter 2.6. Chapter 2.7 discusses a theoretical concept that underpins 
discussion of the Principle: the English law rules of equity. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the historical development of the Principle and analyses 
historic case law in light of the normative framework outlined in Chapter 2. 
Having traced the judicial development of the Principle, Chapter 4 will 
examine situations in which the Principle will currently apply and when it 
will not, concluding that the Principle under UK law appears to fit neatly 
into the normative framework for company law, especially in respect of the 
protection that it offers to third party stakeholders. Chapter 5 discusses the 
nature of the Principle and concludes that it is, ultimately, a subset of 
equity. 
 
The core hypothesis of this thesis, therefore, is that whilst the Principle 
generally operates in a manner coherent with the theoretical framework of 
company law, the flexibility retained by the courts to utilise the Principle to 
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2. THEORETICAL TOOLKIT 
The Principle is part of decision making by companies. Before examining the 
application of the Principle we need to see how the Principle should apply. 
Accordingly, prior to analysing the judicial application of the Principle, this 
thesis will rehearse the theoretical background to the company itself and 
corporate decision making. It will do so by reviewing (a) the theoretical 
origins of the company, (b) in whose interest a company should be run, (c) 
which category of corporate constituents should be able to make decisions 
on behalf of a company, (d) the level of formality that should be required in 
any such decision making and the English law of equity. This chapter 
therefore provides a theoretical toolkit for the rest of this thesis. 
 
2.1. THE ORIGINS OF THE MODERN COMPANY 
 
2.1.1. WHERE DOES A MODERN COMPANY COME FROM? 
It has been stated that “the word company has no strictly legal meaning”.7 
However, the vast majority of jurisdictions have created a form of business 
entity with the same 5 characteristics: “legal personality, limited liability, 
transferable shares, delegated management under a board structure and 
investor ownership”.8 Most jurisdictions have legislated or recognised a 
vehicle into which people put money with no risk of being asked for 
additional money, which is actively managed by a separate group (or subset) 
of people and which can be exited by individual investors without 
withdrawing their funds from the organisation. The majority of these 
characteristics can be achieved contractually (management can be 
delegated, exit strategies can be negotiated, and trust structures can, 
subject to discussion below, insulate the assets of shareholders from an 
investment). It is, however, not possible under English law to contractually 
                                                     
7 Stanley, Re [1906] 1 Ch. 131, see paragraph 1 -1 of Paul L. Davies and Sarah Worthington 
(ed) Gower & Davies' Principles of Modern Company Law (9th Edn,, London 2012)   
8 Renier Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies and others, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A 
Comparative and Functional Approach (2nd Edn, OUP 2009) 1 
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create a separate legal personality.9 We must first explore why companies 
are granted separate legal personality. 
 
There were historically three key rival interpretations of where a company 
obtains its personality from: the state conceded separate legal personality 
to entities, that the shareholders contractually agreed to create a new 
entity, and the company itself was somehow a natural person.10  Taking 
these strands in turn: 
 
(a) The “State Gift” Theory.  
This theory states that the benefit of a separate legal personality arises 
from the state, subject to whatever terms and conditions that the state 
happens to deem fit. Its adherents can point to a 1612 decision in which Sir 
Edward Coke opined “incorporation cannot be created without the King”.11  
They can also point to the Bubble Act 1720 which prohibited the use of the 
joint stock company without express approval from the state. These 
examples can be used to present an argument that, historically and 
theoretically, legal personality derived as a gift from the state. 
 
(b) The “Contractarian” Theory. 
Another interpretation is that legal personality arose because private actors 
desired it and utilised existing trust and agency rules to achieve it. Mahoney 
has characterised Coke’s statement above and the Bubble Act as political 
moves undertaken by a state attempting to regain control over every aspect 
of civic life, including business organisation. He cites admiralty law 
developments to demonstrate the common law’s ability to create a form of 
separate legal personality.12 Under this view, corporate law involves private 
                                                     
9 Scottish partnerships enjoy such a benefit – Partnership Act 1890 s4(2) 
10 Brian R. Cheffins, The Trajectory of (Corporate Law) Scholarship, (CUP 2004 ) (“Cheffins 
Lecture”) 39 
11 Sutton’s Hospital (1612) 77 E.R. 937 
12 Paul G Mahoney, 'Contract or Concession? An Essay on the History of Corporate Law ' 34 
Georgia Law Review 873 
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actors voluntarily contracting to create all facets of the modern company, 
with the state occasionally interfering with this process. 
 
(c) The “Real Entity” Theory.  
This theory characterised each of the above as somehow claiming that the 
company was a fiction, whereas in fact it is a separate entity, entirely 
separate from its various corporators.13 This had the advantage of 
recognising an internal aspect to the company, and therefore raised early 
issues of corporate governance and questions of how a company should 
make decisions.14 
 
This debate became rather abstract in nature and accordingly was 
concluded to be misconceived,15 concluding that a company’s legal 
personality was more than just an aggregation of people, but less than a 
natural person.16 It has, however, been noted that modern analysis has 
obliquely revisited this subject. Hansmann and Kraakman17 have proposed 
that the purpose of a company is to separate assets of the shareholder from 
the creditors of the company (referred to as “defensive asset partitioning”) 
and the assets of the company from the creditors of the shareholder 
(referred to as “affirmative asset partitioning”). They have posited that the 
former is contractually achievable; but the latter is more difficult to 
achieve without legal intervention. Cheffins has argued that this could be 
viewed as a modern variant of the State Gift theory.18 However, affirmative 
asset partitioning can indeed be achieved by contractual means. It is easy to 
point to modern commercial trust structures and see how contractual 
methods achieve affirmative asset partitioning. As previously noted, 
                                                     
13 Frederick Pollock, 'Has the Common Law received the Fiction Theory of Corporations?' 
(1911) 27 Law Quarterly Review 219 
14 Susan Watson, 'How the company became an entity: a new understanding of corporate 
law,' 2015 Journal of Business Law 120 
15 John Dewey, 'The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality' (1926) 35 Yale Law 
Journal 655, cited  in Cheffins Lecture (n10) 40 
16 Cheffins Lecture (n10) 39 
17 Henry Hansmann and Renier Kraakman, 'The Essential Role of Organizational Law' (2000) 
110 Yale Law Journal 387 
18 Cheffins Lecture (n10) 72 
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Mahoney has suggested that measures such as the Bubble Act were only 
implemented to stymie commercial development in achieving both 
affirmative and defensive asset partitioning. Adopting Mahoney’s analysis, 
the state is not required for separate personality, providing a historic 
victory to the Contractarian analysis (even if there is no normative 
conclusion on the subject). 
 
Despite the debate on the origin of legal personality being resolved, it is 
helpful to consider the historical context in which this debate arose. Prior to 
incorporation of a company by registration, the primary legal forms of 
business entity were partnerships and Corporations (incorporated by royal 
charter). Corporate law is generally regards to have “developed seamlessly 
from the law of partnership”.19 Mahoney states that the intervention of the 
state discussed above meant that the common law of an entity between a 
statutory corporation and a small partnership was retarded, so when 
incorporation by registration became more readily available, the courts had 
to apply the only legal norms available to them to the new entity.20  Watson 
has argued that modern company law is, effectively, a hybrid of legal norms 
relating to statutory incorporated companies and partnerships rather than a 
neat descendant of partnership law.21 The tension between these two 
origins of the modern company can be seen in the conflicts between various 
theories of corporate law which have been reviewed above and which are to 
be reviewed over the course of this thesis. State Gift theorists can look to 
statutory incorporations for their analysis, whereas Contractarians can take 
their justification from norms rooted in partnership law. Any tension which 
arises from an attempt to apply one set of rules to a modern company is 
traceable to this historic debate, which is in turn linked to the size of 
company in mind. Implicit within the logic of adherents to the State Gift 
theory is that the company in question is large with a dispersed shareholder 
base (i.e. Corporations incorporated by statute), whereas implicit in the 
argument of the Contractarians is that the company in question is a quasi-
                                                     
19 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 W.L.R. 1092, 1098 (Lord Hoffman) 
20 Mahoney (n12) 888 
21 Watson (n14) 
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partnership whose participants have voluntarily joined together for mutual 
business ends (and therefore must have some form of knowledge/dealing 
with each other previously). 
 
The UK could be argued to favour the Contractarian viewpoint in modern UK 
law, evidenced by the dilution of the ultra vires principle. Prior to 1989 it 
was possible to argue that a company lacked the capacity to undertake a 
transaction, whereas since 1989 a third party acting in good faith has been 
protected from such a risk.  Further, a company incorporated under the 
Companies Act 2006 no longer even requires to state its corporate objects.22 
This is a victory for Contractarians as, from their viewpoint, a company 
should be able to do anything that its corporators at a given time wish it to. 
A State Gift advocate would instead limit a company’s capacity to acts 
within the purview of the reason it was granted separate legal personality 
(such advocate would believe that there are actions that should not be 
within a company’s capacity). 
 
It has been argued that scholars tend to view corporate law as either a 
matter of public law or private law.23 This can also be viewed as an 
extension of the hybrid dimension of the corporate form. Corporations 
obviously have a quasi-public law link, as they only obtain their legal nature 
from the state, subject to whatever conditions the state deems fit. 
Partnerships, however, have a distinctly private law outlook as they are 
privately and voluntarily formed. These lines of reasoning can extend into a 
company's capacity – if it obtains its personality by concession from the 
state then the actions that a company can undertake can be limited by the 
state as part of such gift, whereas if it obtains its personality by agreement 
between the corporators then there should be no limit on it undertaking any 
otherwise legal actions. The arguments outlined so far are actually false 
dichotomies: those envisioning a large company are more likely to see these 
issues as a matter for public law with its personality arising from the state 
                                                     
22 Eg Gower & Davies (n7)  p167 
23 Alan Wolfe, 'The Modern Corporation: Private Agent or Public Actor?' (1993) 50 
Washington & Lee Law Review 1673 
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and those envisioning a small company are more likely to see these issues as 
a matter for private law with its personality arising by way of contract.  
 
2.1.2. AGENCY COSTS 
Whichever theoretical and historical norms resulted in the creation of a 
separate legal personality for companies, a modern company is a new entity 
separate from all relevant constituents (its residual owners, its managers 
and those who interact with it). Jensen and Meckling stated that where: 
“one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the 
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent”24 
 
there arises a risk of self dealing on behalf of the agent. They define the 
costs incurred by the principal in minimising such self dealing as agency 
costs, and argue it is inevitable that such costs will arise for a modern 
company. For modern companies, these agency problems arise in three main 
areas:25  
 
(a) Conflicts between shareholders and managers 
A 1932 publication by Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner Means reviewed the 
position for American public companies and concluded that the corporate 
form has created a “separation of ownership and control”,26 with dispersed 
shareholders with small stakes in the business delegating all powers to a 
centralised board of directors. Throughout this thesis, such a company shall 
be referred to as a "Berle/Means Company". Bainbridge states that this 
“creates the potential for shareholder and managerial interests to diverge”, 
going on to ask: 
                                                     
24 Michael C Jensen and William H Meckling, 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure' (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305, 308 
25 Kraakman et al, (n8) p2 
26 Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, (rev 
edn, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1967) 
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“Suppose the board of directors of Acme, Inc., is musing over the 
following question: “I can either spend $100 million on a new 
corporate jet or I can distribute the $100 million to the shareholders 
by increasing the size of the dividend.” Can anyone doubt that some 
board will buy the jet?”27 
 
Accordingly, costs in this category are those incurred by shareholders or the 
company in minimising self dealing by management. 
 
Potential agency costs in this category are increased where there is a 
dispersed share ownership, no individual controlling shareholder and a large 
number of shareholders who are not directors. For close companies with a 
commonality of directors and shareholders, this category of agency costs are 
minimised. 
 
Contractarians believe that shareholders are capable of protecting 
themselves via contracts. Accordingly, Contractarians have no issue with 
agreed agency costs in this area (for example high levels of executive 
remuneration) based on pre –set metrics. In other words, agency costs in 
this category which the shareholders have agreed will be acceptable to the 
Contractarians. Any self dealing outside of those agreed by shareholders, 
however, will be highly objectionable to Contractarians as it perverts the 
underlying corporate contracts. State Gift theorists are more likely to see a 
general need for protection against any agency costs by the state, as any 
agency cost will undermine the public reason for the corporation being 
allowed to exist. State Gift minded thinkers, however, will be less 
concerned by this particular category as they will expect shareholders’ 
interests to be compromised by management in certain situations (see 
discussion at paragraph 2.2.2 below).  
 
(b) Conflicts between shareholders and other stakeholders 
                                                     
27 Stephen M Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice (OUP 2008)  
6 
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Shareholders' ability to direct the activities of the company (which is 
discussed more fully at section 2.2.1 below) risks agency costs arising 
between shareholders and other stakeholders. This is exacerbated by the 
presence of limited liability for the modern corporate form, which 
encourages more risky business ventures. The lack of recourse to 
shareholders in the event of insolvency means that shareholders get any 
upside but creditors “bear the risk of business failure”.28  
 
Accordingly, costs in this category are those incurred by other stakeholders 
or the company in minimising shareholders' directing the company to 
maximise the return/value to the shareholders at the expense of other 
stakeholders.  
 
State Gift thinkers will be particularly concerned about this category of 
agency costs, for reasons discussed in paragraph 2.2.2 below.  
Contractarians, however, are likely to be ambivalent on this category of 
agency costs because they assume that creditors price such a risk into 
interactions with the company. This is because the systemic risk to financial 
creditors of shareholder self-interest is well known and so this can be priced 
in to dealings with corporate actors. This analysis can be applied to any 
transactional counterparty of a company, as it is able to balance the 
importance of the interaction against the inherent risk in striking the 
bargain. Despite worries of imperfect information about specific corporate 
transactions,29 one of the effects of a company being generally required to 
include ‘limited’ in its name30 has the effect of ensuring that a voluntary 





                                                     
28 Brian R. Cheffins, Company Law Theory, Structure and Operations (OUP 2008) ("Cheffins 
Theory") 497 
29 E.g.  ibid 127 
30 Companies Act 2006 ss58 and 59 
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(c) Conflicts among shareholders 
Majority decision making by shareholders31 creates the possibility that 
majority shareholders will abuse their position to maximise their return 
from the company to the detriment of minority shareholders. This is 
exacerbated as shareholders owe no fiduciary duties to the company in 
respect of how they vote.32 In a UK context a minority shareholder retains 
protections from fraud by the majority,33 unfair prejudice in the running of 
a company34 and the ability to undertake a derivative action in the event 
that the actions of the majority shareholder has the possibility of being 
detrimental to the company as a whole.35 
 
2.1.3. HOW TO SOLVE AGENCY PROBLEMS 
Having identified a key category of issues that arise in a corporate context, 
attention should be turned to the most efficient manner to resolve such 
issues. Cheffins has identified three types of rules that can be employed in 
general under corporate law, and especially to reduce agency costs. He 
identifies these as mandatory, permissive and presumptive (or default).36 
Cheffins ultimately advocates utilising mandatory and permissive rules with 
caution.37 
 
Cheffins concludes that, in the ordinary course, rules should be default rules 
in the corporate sphere. It seems evident that a rule should only be default 
if it effects only those who can opt-out of the specific legal rule. If there 
are (and will always be) high negative effects to a third party then any 
                                                     
31  E.g. ordinary resolutions require majority decision making, whilst special resolutions 
require 75% to pass the resolution. 
32 E.g. Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd, [1991] 1 A.C. 187 and 
North West Transportation Co Ltd v Beatty (1887) L.R. 12 App. Cas 589 PC (Can). It has, 
however, been argued that various minority shareholder protections are tantamount to 
fiduciary duties on  majority shareholders – Robert Flannigan, 'Shareholder Fiduciary 
Accountability' 2014 Journal of Business Law 1. 
33 E.g., Atwood v Merryweather (1867) L.R. 5 Eq 464n. 
34 Companies Act 2006 ss 994-999 
35 Companies Act 2006 Part 11 
36 Cheffins Theory (n28) 217 – 264, and also Jonathan Hardman 'Necessary and Balanced? 
Critical analysis of the Legal Writings (Counterparts and Delivery) (Scotland) Act 2015'  2016 
(3) Juridical Review 177, 186-188 
37 Cheffins Theory (n28) 249 
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prohibition on such course of action should be mandatory rather than 
default (as otherwise decision makers who only received an advantage from 
opting out would always opt out, leaving those who were harmed by the opt 
out entirely unprotected by a rule ostensibly protecting them). Those that 
should be able to opt out of a default rule should be those that it is 
designed to protect. Therefore default rules to protect shareholders should 
be able to be waived by the shareholders, but default rules designed to 
protect creditors should not – instead the creditors should be the only ones 
entitled to waive such default rule. It may prove impossible to identify all 
potential participants to such category, and will prove equally as difficult to 
allocate voting rights.38 
 
2.1.4. CONCLUSION 
There remains an unresolved conflict on the fundamental theoretical basis 
for the existence of a company, which has arisen from historical 
uncertainty. The two sides of the debate are, however, beginning from 
slightly different assumptions about the entity that they are discussing. 
There has been a recent trend in corporate law towards maximising the 
freedom of the company in the UK, which would be more consistent with a 
Contractarian analysis of the basis for a company. 
 
Agency costs are a commonly used corporate law analytical tool and will be 
vital for normative analysis of the Principle. Rules should be default and 
waivable by those who they are designed to protect. Any protections 
designed for third parties should, however, either be mandatory rules or 
only waivable by those third parties. 
 
2.2. IN WHOSE INTEREST SHOULD A COMPANY BE RUN? 
Whilst the theoretical origin of a company risks being unnecessarily 
abstract, the presence of this separate legal entity raises an evident 
                                                     
38 For example, tort victims may not be known.  Even if they, it is difficult to quantify their 
claims to allocate voting (should a claim of £1,000,000 with a 10% chance of success carry 
the same weight as a £100,000 claim with a 100% chance of success? How would this be 
calculated?). 
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question: in whose interests should this entity be run?  This has been 
described as the “Ends of Corporate Governance”39 (as opposed to the 
means of corporate governance which will be discussed below in this thesis). 
This may seem only relevant to director decision making and not 
shareholder decision making (which is the focus of this thesis). However, if a 
company should be run exclusively for the benefit of the shareholders, then 
it logically follows that such shareholders should have the maximum 
flexibility to control decision making by the company. They therefore should 
be entitled to instruct or override the directors and to do so with a level of 
formality that they decide amongst themselves. In other words, the 
Principle should be very strong if a company should be run exclusively for 
shareholders. If, however, a company should be run in the interests of other 
categories of actor then the shareholders should not exclusively have 
decision making rights in respect of the company and so the Principle 
should, normatively, be weak. This question has also been subject to some 
debate. There are two main schools of thought (with some variation within 
each such school), being those who believe in the Shareholder Value model40 
and those who believe in the Stakeholder model. Taking these in turn: 
 
2.2.1.  SHAREHOLDER VALUE MODEL 
This school holds that a company should be run almost exclusively in the 
interests of its shareholders. A company is seen as merely a “nexus of 
contracts”41– with the primary contract being with the shareholders who 
invest their capital into the firm. Shareholders have the residual value of 
the company. Whilst every other entity interacting with the company has a 
fixed claim against the company, shareholders are entitled to any upside 
that is left. Therefore, provided that the company is solvent, shareholders 
are the only party with a direct interest between a company making £5m 
profit and £10m profit. This means that shareholders are the only 
                                                     
39 Bainbridge (n27) 23 
40 Sometimes called “Shareholder Primacy”. This definition, however, can also be used in 
resect of  interaction between shareholders and directors. To avoid  confusion, references 
to “Shareholder Primacy” will include not only primacy of shareholders over other 
stakeholders, but also primacy of shareholders over directors. 
41 Jensen and Meckling (n24) 
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constituency who benefit from any increase in the marginal success of the 
company and therefore the appropriate guardians of its interests.42 This 
helps minimise agency costs, as directors are directly (and exclusively) 
acting as agents of the shareholders and are therefore directly accountable 
to them. Hansmann and Kraakman have suggested that this model has 
become the dominant normative global model. They cite as reasons for this 
the intellectual cohesion of the argument, the failure of all other models 
and pressures of global competition (when faced with a decision of which 
jurisdiction to invest in, a shareholder is likely to favour those jurisdictions 
which hold shareholder’s interests as paramount).43 This can be seen as an 
extension of Contractarian analysis – if the company is a private entity 
voluntarily created by the shareholders, then only the interests of those 
shareholders should be taken into account when deciding the actions of that 
company. It therefore agrees that other constituencies price any systemic 
risk into their interactions with the company. 
 
 
2.2.2. STAKEHOLDER  MODEL 
The Shareholder Value model is heavily criticised. Even Hansmann has noted 
that “there continues to emanate….a broad disquiet about the standard 
shareholder-orientated model”.44 Freeman has explained that pure 
Shareholder Value could require directors to undertake “actions which are 
immoral or unethical, as well as illegal”.45 Instead, he explains that 
companies have many stakeholders that should be taken into account in 
corporate decision making, including employees, customers, suppliers, 
environmentalists and shareholders, and that is the way to maximise the 
value of the firm. It has also been pointed out that Shareholder Value is 
incorrect on its fundamental assumptions – there are many involuntary 
                                                     
42 Frank H Easterbrook and Daniel R Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, 
(HUP 1991) 38, 68 
43 Henry Hansmann and Renier Kraakman, 'The End of History for Corporate Law' (2000) 89 
The Georgetown Law Journal 439 
44 Henry Hansmann, 'How Close is the End of History?' (2006) 31 The Journal of Corporation 
Law 745, 746  
45 R. Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, (CUP 1983) 104 
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creditors (e.g. tort victims) who are not able to price potential risks into 
their interactions with the company.46 Even if they were, the disparity of 
bargaining power and information would make such ability almost 
meaningless.47 Therefore in order to protect those who interact with the 
firm, the company must be managed in the interests of all of the 
stakeholders.48 Millon suggests that this can be achieved by expanding the 
category of actors to whom directors owe fiduciary duties to include 
stakeholders.49 Mitchell has stated this would more accurately and fairly 
reflect the impact that a company has in society:50 consider the 
disproportionate effect closing a plant has on a small town with no other 
employment – if an entire community can be decimated it does not seem 
equitable to only allow the interests of shareholders to be taken into 
account for such decision.  Blair & Stout go even further and state that 
rather than a company using shareholder funds for profit, it receives specific 
investments from all constituents/stakeholders and that corporate activity 
is therefore a “team production”.51  It is not only shareholders that benefit 
from increased marginal profit from the firm – this may result in the hiring 
of extra employees, expanding operations, incurring or repaying credit. Blair 
and Stout demonstrate that allocating “ownership” to one member of the 
team results in less effort from both the owner (as they will own the fruits 
of the enterprise regardless of their input but require the input of others) 
and other constituencies (as they will not own the fruits of the enterprise 
regardless of their input). They therefore propose that the directors should 
be appointed by the various “team members” and that the role of the board 
should be to be a “mediating hierarchy” amongst the team members.  This 
                                                     
46 G G Sollars, 'An Appraisal of Shareholder Proportional Liability' (2001) 32 Journal of 
Business Ethics 329 
47 Eg W W Bratton 'Game Theory and the Restoration of Honour to Corporate Law's Duty of 
Loyalty'  in  Lawrence E Mitchell (ed) Progressive Corporate Law (Westview 1995) 
48 L L Dallas 'Working Towards a New Paradigm in  Progressive Corporate Law', in Mitchell 
ibid 
49 See David Millon, 'Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform 
Strategies' in Mitchell ibid. Fiduciary duties do not have to fully align to decision making 
powers, however as these tend to correlate it remains helpful analysis 
50 Lawrence E Mitchell, 'A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate 
Constituency Statutes'  (1992) 70 Texas Law Review 579 
51 Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, 'A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law'  (1999) 
(2)85 Virginia Law Review 247 
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is a rejection of Contractarianism – a company is more than merely a private 
creation of shareholders; a belief that a company somehow has inherent 
additional responsibilities (a partnership or sole trader, for example, does 
not have to take into account the interests of their employees). This implies 
a more public element to the company than attaches to other forms of legal 
organisation, which echoes State Gift theory – if the Stakeholder model is 
not merely a continuation of the State Gift theory then it at least shares the 
same basis and utilises very similar arguments. 
 
2.2.3. EVALUATION OF STAKEHOLDER THEORY  
Advocates of the Stakeholder model usually start with a critique of 
Shareholder Value. Stakeholder arguments have their own weaknesses. 
Freeman’s arguments are a reason for management to ensure stakeholder 
happiness to maximise the value of the firm – which is achievable in a 
Shareholder Value model (and Freeman implies that its purpose is to 
maximise shareholder value). Freeman's analysis is limited to a company's 
“turbulent times”52 – even Shareholder Value advocates acknowledge that in 
such circumstances interests of creditors become superior to shareholder 
interests.53 Further, as discussed previously, voluntary creditors are able to 
price systemic risks of corporate form into such interactions.  Lack of 
information or bargaining power is irrelevant – the risk applies to the entire 
corporate form. This analysis does not, of course, apply to involuntary 
creditors (eg tort victims). However, there are several points to note in this 
regard. Firstly, any involuntary interaction is unplanned and so would not 
have been avoided because of corporate form. This means that the relevant 
creditor could not chose which entity it wished to form this relationship 
with. As law recognises a limitation of liability through bankruptcy,54 any 
such risk would apply to every situation. In addition, the involuntary nature 
of the interaction means that the relevant parties (management, 
                                                     
52 Freeman (n45) 3 
53 Easterbrook and Fischel (n42) p69 
54 E.g., if an individual’s car is hit by a bankrupt uninsured driver, they have no recourse for 
this involuntary interaction 
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shareholders and the stakeholder) may not be aware that the relationship 
has formed – given this uncertainty as to who falls in to this category it is 
even more difficult to assign decision making rights to this category of 
actors. 
 
Stakeholder theory asserts that stakeholders bear risks of company failure as 
well as shareholders and therefore stakeholders participate in the marginal 
risk of companies. However, it rarely deals with the principle underpinning 
of Shareholder Value – that, as residual claimants, shareholders are the only 
constituents whose interests are directly aligned with the company. This can 
be further seen as it is only the shareholders’ interests in the company that 
can be sold to a third party and which has a chance of appreciating in 
value.55 Increased success of the company may result in increased success 
for other stakeholders, but only shareholders have a marketable claim 
increased by the success of the company and therefore remain the only true 
residual claimants. All other stakeholders want to avoid a negative (a 
reduction in the recoverability of their claim) rather than actively seek a 
positive (the increase in the success of the company). It is therefore a 
fallacy to equate the interests of other stakeholders to the interests of 
shareholders. However, Kelly and Parkinson point out that income generated 
by a company for any specific act by an employee is theoretically variable 
but, in practice, is fixed by bargain as a wage.56 Replacing this fixed level of 
remuneration with a variable rate removes the argument of Shareholder 
Value theorists that shareholders’ interests are unique: this is a descriptive 
a rather than a normative argument. There is, however, a normative 
explanation for stakeholders choosing to so structure their interactions with 
a company. To fully equate their interests with shareholders, a stakeholder 
would not just have to participate in marginal reward of a company’s 
                                                     
55 Choses in action in respect of torts and receivables can be sold, but these claims are for 
fixed, certain sums: the quantum of the claim will not appreciate with an increase in 
success of the firm 
56 Gavin Kelly and John Parkinson, 'The Conceptual Foundations of the Company'  in  J 
Parkinson, A Gamble and G Kelly (ed)  The Political of Economy of the Company (Hart 2000) 
124 
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success,57 they would also have to participate in the marginal risk of a 
company’s failure.58 Stakeholders may prefer to fix their returns from the 
company at a pre-agreed level for the purposes of certainty rather than 
participate in this risk. Stakeholder theorists falsely assume that adopting a 
stakeholder approach would automatically improve the position for 
stakeholders. Currently, each stakeholder other than shareholders has their 
interests protected by other aspects of the legal system. Insolvency law 
ensures that creditors recover before shareholders in insolvency, 
employment law protects employees, environmental law protects the 
environment, consumers have protections from consumer law, and so on. 
The only constituency without a direct legal protection is a community 
whose only plant is shutting. However, the community are only concerned 
that the plant remains open, not with the corporate form itself – if this asset 
is sold to a third party to continue then the community will be satisfied even 
if this results in the dissolution or insolvency of the company. These 
protections for other stakeholders exist because a form of shareholder value 
currently exists in the UK.59 Any attempt to include other stakeholders in 
corporate decision making reduces the rationale for them having such 
protections: if directors had to balance the interests of all stakeholders 
when making any decision, why should those constituents also enjoy their 
current legal protections? Instead their only protections would be to hope 
that the directors prioritised their interests, without recourse if they failed 
to do so having regard to the interests of all other stakeholders. This 
presents another frequent critique of the Stakeholder model – agency costs 
between directors and other stakeholders would increase without any 
certain remedy for any stakeholder.   
 
Adopting the Stakeholder model will increase agency costs for the company 
and risk worsening stakeholders' protections without redress. Merely adding 
                                                     
57 i.e. receiving more from the company should it perform well 
58 i.e. receiving less from the company should it perform badly 
59 Companies Act 2006 s 172 - directors should take into account various considerations 
when making decisions, including effects on stakeholders. However, this duty is owed to 
the company and a breach of this can be ratified by the shareholders normally. Despite 
appearing to provide stakeholder empowerment, the lack of a remedy means that this is a 
variation on Shareholder Value. 
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to the number of principals does not automatically increases agency costs. 
However, the more categories of principals that the same person is agent 
for, the harder it is to apportion decision making amongst the principals.60 
The more heterogeneous the principals are, the less likely they are to have 
the same priorities and so there is an increased chance of conflicting 
instructions to the agent.  Stakeholders are better relying on their existing 
legal protections rather than trying to amend corporate law, which may 
prejudice their existing rights.  
 
There are two further points to make. Firstly, a Shareholder Value approach 
does not preclude entities being created to follow a Stakeholder model at 
the option of the shareholders. Those promoting new entities can create 
charities, co-operatives, mutual societies and friendly societies (all such 
stakeholder-centric entities will be known as “Alternative Structures” for 
the purposes of this thesis) if the shareholders so wish.61 Conversely, a legal 
system which adopts a Stakeholder approach must preclude a Shareholder 
Value company being established as the broad category of stakeholders that 
currently and in the future will exist includes those that cannot be known. If 
they cannot be known then they cannot agree to alienate rights.  Finite, 
identifiable shareholders are clearly capable of alienating the rights which 
attach to shares they own: it is more difficult to conceive how a structure 
could waive decision making rights for future tort victims. Parallels abound 
to the theoretical categories identified – Contractarians see no issue in 
promoters creating Alternative Structures if that is what they have 
contracted to do. State Gift theorists believe the terms of any corporate 
vehicle to be established by the state, and therefore incapable of 
contractual variation. Secondly, empirically there has been a decline in 
                                                     
60 (n38) 
61 For discussion of Alternative Structures, see Jenny Harrow and Susan D. Phillips  
'Corporate Governance and Nonprofits: Facing up to Hybridization and Homogenization' in 
Mike Wright, Donald S. Siegel, Keven Keasey and Igor Filatotchv (ed),  The Oxford Handbook 
of Corporate Governance (OUP 2014) 
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Alternative Structures.62 This shows that, despite some hope of increased 
demand for a Stakeholder approach,63 this is not occurring in practice. 
 
In conclusion, a company should be run in the interests of its shareholders 
with strong protections in other legal disciplines for its other stakeholders.  
The role of company law should be to facilitate a company being run in the 
interests of shareholders so long as so doing does not violate the legal 
protections that other stakeholders enjoy.  
 
2.3. HOW SHOULD A COMPANY ORGANISE ITS AFFAIRS? 
Having established that a company should be run for the interests of its 
shareholders, we now turn to which organs of the company should make 
decisions and how. Having dealt with the “ends”, we now examine the 
“means” of corporate governance.64 
 
If the company is run in the shareholders’ interests, then surely the 
shareholders are the best placed to direct the affairs of the company? This, 
however, is not generally seen to be the case. As noted at the start of this 
chapter, one of the fundamental basics of the company is that management 
is delegated by shareholders to directors/management. It is often 
impractical for shareholders to take a daily interest in the activities of the 
company so most articles of association delegate management of the 
company to the directors.65 Cheffins states: 
“[t]he almost universal practice is for a company’s articles of 
association to endow the directors with the power to manage the 
company.”66 
 
                                                     
62 eg, see Paddy Ireland, 'Shareholder Primacy and the Distribution of Wealth' (2005) 68 
Modern Law Review 49, 54 
63 E.g, J. Armour, S. Deakin and S. Konzelmann 'Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of 
UK Corporate Governance (2003) 41 British Journal of Industrial Relations 531 
64 Bainbridge (n27) 23 
65 E.g. Model Articles for Private Companies limited by shares Art 3 
66 Cheffins Theory (n28) 603 
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The efficiency savings of such delegation outweigh its agency costs.67 For 
publicly traded companies, the speed of potential changes to shareholdings 
make it impractical for the shareholders of a company to have any active 
role in the business of the company. Bainbridge states that, normatively, 
the shareholders of a company should not be involved in the management of 
a company. Bainbridge draws on Arrow’s analysis that an organisation has to 
be either run consensually or by imposition of authority.68 Having seen that 
consensus is impossible, Bainbridge argues that the only entity which can 
provide authority is the board. He also draws on Berle & Means to highlight 
that shareholders may have a rational apathy as to how a company is run 
and so should not be involved in the management of the company.  Having 
seen empirical issues with stakeholders being able to influence appointment 
of directors, Bainbridge concludes that corporate law should (and does) 
embody “director primacy” with the directors being the main constituency 
in a company. He therefore takes issue with Blair & Stout’s theory of the 
company as a matter of “team production” on two grounds – firstly the 
interests of the company should be wealth maximisation for the 
shareholders, and secondly (and more importantly) the board of directors 
“hires the factors of production, not the other way around”69 so the 
directors cannot be said to be accountable to the relevant factors of 
production that they will pick. 
 
Bainbridge’s analysis has a few weaknesses. Firstly, it is based on specific 
elements of US law which are not replicated n the UK. Section 141(a) of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law provides that the company shall be run 
by the directors. In the UK there is no equivalent general statement of the 
law, merely the model articles (and previously Table A) which empower the 
directors to manage the company: the UK adopts a default rule on the 
subject. It has been argued that the UK position is an anomaly.70 
Bainbridge’s analysis is based on a classic Berle/Means Company with its 
                                                     
67 Easterbrook and Fischel (n42) 4 – 8 
68 Kenneth J Arrow, The Limits of Organisation (Norton, 1974) 
69 Bainbridge (n27) 63 
70 Watson (n14) footnote 94 
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wide shareholder base. He acknowledges that claims to director primacy 
“fare poorly whenever there is a dominant shareholder”71 where there is a 
lower risk of shareholder and the dominant shareholder has control over the 
board. Accordingly, the argument that the board of directors should control 
the activities of the company is limited to situations where the shareholders 
are unable to do so. It is implicit in Bainbridge’s analysis that shareholders 
should make decisions and only when they cannot (which will be the normal 
position) does the primacy of directors arise. Given that the legal norms in 
question must cover the entire spectrum from Berle/Means Companies to 
closely held companies, management by directors should be the default 
position, with shareholders being able to opt out should they see fit. This is 
the position that we have in the UK: directors obtain their power from the 
articles which can be amended by the shareholders. Directors have 
ostensible authority to bind the company so that third parties do not need 
to examine the chains of authority when contracting with a company.72 
 
2.4. FORMALITY OF DECISION MAKING 
The next issue to discuss must be the level of formality that decision making 
should take.  
 
The traditional method to make decisions by any organ of the company has 
been for that organ to hold a meeting of its members.73 For shareholders, 
this is known as a general meeting. Decision making by meeting is important 
because it gives the decision makers an opportunity to deliberate on a 
specific topic. As Simmonds stated: 
 
“It is plausible to suppose that such confrontation and collective 
deliberation opportunities would enhance the voting decision.”74 
 
                                                     
71 Bainbridge (n27) 12 
72 Gower and Davies (n7) 175 
73 Gower and Davies (n7) 436 
74 R Simmonds, 'Why must we meet? Thinking about why shareholders meetings are required' 
(2001) 19 Company and Securities Law Journal 506 
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In a shareholder context, if a company wrote to each shareholder for 
agreement on a matter, that would separate the shareholders from each 
other. This creates a power disparity between the board of directors (one 
unified body) and the general meeting (acting by each individual 
shareholder). The options presented to each shareholder are merely to 
assent or dissent, without any insight into the views of the other 
shareholders. By contrast, a properly convened meeting has the opportunity 
to discuss, debate, reason and actively chose other courses of action. This 
analysis assumes that a formal meeting is the only opportunity for 
discussion; without a meeting the participants would have little information 
and little opportunity to deliberate. It presupposes that there is a 
separation between the ownership and control of the company. Boros 
summarises that the purpose a meeting (especially shareholder meeting) is 
to hold the relevant managers accountable.75 Shareholder meetings act as 
an opportunity to reduce agency costs between shareholders and directors. 
It follows that shareholders meetings are more important when there is 
higher risk of agency costs between shareholders and directors. We have 
seen above that these agency costs are likely to be higher in a Berle/Means 
Company with a strong separation of ownership and control, so there is a 
higher requirement for formality in decision making when shareholders are 
less able to act in concert. The argument for formality in decision making is 
stronger in larger companies with more shareholders. This is an extension of 
the debate outlined above as to which organ of the company should make 
decisions. In deciding both issues, there are different considerations 
between Berle/Means Companies and closely held companies. In the former, 
there is more of a need to empower the directors in order to maximise the 
value to the shareholders, but in order to protect shareholders from the 
directors there is a need for increased formality in shareholder decision 
making. Conversely, in the latter the shareholders have no need for such 
protection, and so a reduced need for formality. In line with the conclusion 
as to which organ of the company make decisions, the default position 
                                                     
75 Elizabeth Boros, 'Corporate Governance in Cyberspace: Who stands to gain what from the 
virtual meeting?' (2003) 3 Journal of Corporate Legal Studies 149,162 - 164 
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should be towards formality unless waived by the shareholders. Such waiver 
should be able to be undertaken informally by the shareholders if they so 
wish. 
 
This analysis extends beyond agency costs between shareholders and 
managers. The same issues arise where there is a disparity of power 
between principals. Accordingly, the argument for formality in decision 
making amongst shareholders is stronger when there is a dominant but not 
sole shareholder (creating minority shareholders who require to monitor the 
actions of the dominant majority shareholders). Any requirement for 
shareholders to act unanimously in waiving a default rule removes these 
risks for minority shareholders and therefore removes the requirement for 
formality.   Similar analysis applies to the external dealings of a company: 
its interaction with other stakeholders. We have seen little value in any 
other stakeholder's claim to participate in general decision-making by a 
company, but that they do have a right to ensure that their interests are 
protected, so this agency cost analysis is applies to them as well. Whilst 
stakeholders do not have a normative claim to participate in decision 
making by a company, they do have a right to certainty in their interaction 
with such company in order that they can price any risk into their 
interactions. Stakeholders should thus be protected where formality has 
been waived by the shareholders. Stakeholders should be able to rely upon 
the ostensible authority of directors to bind the company, but also of the 
shareholders actual authority as the ultimate decision makers in respect of 
the company when they purport to exercise such. The absence of such 
reliance would mean that stakeholders would have a strong argument to 
insist upon formality in decision making so that they can follow the clear 
decision making chain of the company and ensure that the company is 
bound. Stakeholders should be entitled to rely on a decision by the 
shareholders to waive their requirement for formality. In any rule as to 
formality in either shareholder or director decision making which is designed 
to protect stakeholders from the decisions or actions of shareholders or the 
company must be a mandatory rule in order to avoid the purpose of the rule 
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being undermined. In conclusion, a rule designed to protect shareholders 
(either from each other or from the directors of a company) should be a 
default rule which can be waived by the shareholders acting unanimously, 
whereas any company law rule designed to protect third parties should be a 
mandatory rule in order to protect them from decisions made by the 
shareholders. This oversimplifies matters considerably as it assumes that the 
shareholders are a homogenous class whose interests will be directly 
aligned. This is not normally the case and accordingly it is necessary to 
explore how shareholders usually make decisions. 
 
2.5. MAJORITY RULE IN SHAREHOLDER DECISION MAKING 
As discussed in paragraph 2.3, decisions must be made either by consensus 
or by authority– in the case of shareholder decision making, authority is 
achieved by majority. Decision making by majority76 presupposes that it is 
too expensive or impractical to achieve consensus on any particular subject. 
Authority is only required in a corporate setting if consensus is not 
achievable. As we have discussed, shareholders have a strong claim to be 
the ultimate decision makers in the actions of a company. The way that 
shareholders create authority amongst themselves is therefore by adopting 
an approach of majority rule. Consensus overrides and fits within these 
structures as a resolution passed by all of the shareholders is equally as 
valid for these purposes.  
 
If shareholders were obliged to consider the interests of others when casting 
their vote then there may be little further to be said on the matter. 
However, shareholders are able to cast their votes however they see fit.77 As 
shareholders are the constituents who should retain residual control over a 
company to direct its affairs, this causes a strong risk of the agency costs 
outlined at paragraph 2.1.2(c) above arising. We have seen that formality in 
decision making is primarily a method to reduce agency costs. Therefore, in 
respect of the agency costs listed in paragraph 2.1.2(c) above, formality 
                                                     
76 See Bainbridge (n27) 37 
77 (n32)  
    27 
 
requires to be observed. Similarly, if majority rule is adopted by 
shareholders when waiving formality, then agency costs may arise. 
Accordingly, any act to waive formality by shareholders must be a 
unanimous decision and cannot be a majority decision. Any operation of the 
Principle must be unanimous by the shareholders.  
 
This of course does not preclude a majority from estopping themselves from 
complaining about a certain course of action if they have informally agreed 
to it. However, this should only estop them personally and will not extend 
to binding the shareholders as a whole. As no decision of the shareholders 
generally can be said to have been made, it therefore follows that the 
estoppel will not extend to any transferee.78  
 
2.6. CONCLUSION 
The normative root of a modern company is not clear, which in turn 
produces different arguments as to who the modern company should be run 
in the interests of. We have seen, however, that the arguments for a 
company being run exclusively in the interests of the shareholders remain 
the strongest. Regardless of this, other stakeholders should have protections 
against the actions of a modern company as provided for by other areas of 
law. Seen in this light, the role of corporate law must be to facilitate the 
advancement of shareholder interests unless they impinge upon protected 
interests of other stakeholders, in which case corporate law should prevent 
the company undertaking such a course of action. 
 
Arguments in favour of mandatory delegation by shareholders in favour of a 
board of directors are fundamentally arguments of convenience. 
Accordingly, where it is practical for them to do so, there is no reason why 
shareholders should not retain the ability to direct the management of the 
company. Formality is only required in order to protect shareholder 
interests from increased agency costs– i.e. in situations that shareholders 
                                                     
78However, decisions shareholders bind their successors. Accordingly, any unanimous 
decision of the shareholders in such circumstances should bind on future transferees. 
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are practically incapable or unwilling to participate in management 
themselves and to protect minority shareholders from oppression by 
majority shareholders. 
 
Any requirements as to decision making being made by the board and/or 
being made through any specific procedure must be normatively seen as 
optional on shareholders and therefore waivable by them. The only 
situations where shareholders as a whole should not be able to do this are 
those in which a third party stakeholder has a legal protection against a 
company – in these situations the company (acting through any organ) should 
not be able to violate the rights of such stakeholder. Therefore rules 
designed to protect shareholders should be default rules, whereas rules 
designed to protect third parties should be mandatory rules. There should 
be some restrictions on the right to waive any requirements as to formality: 
shareholders should only be able to waive such rights unanimously (to 
prevent agency risks for minority shareholders) and third parties should be 
entitled to rely upon such waiver of default formal channels and be certain 
that rules designed to protect them will not be given away by disinterested 
shareholders. 
 
This is key for analysing how the Principle fits into the normative 
background of company law. To do so, we should observe the following: 
 
1. any rule, whether a rule of substance or procedure, which exists 
solely for the benefit of shareholders as a whole should be a 
default rule which can be waived by action of the shareholders as 
a whole. Therefore the Principle should apply to rules which only 
exist for the benefit of the shareholders or company; 
 
2. the Principle should require unanimous action of shareholders to 
avoid the risk of agency costs/oppression of a minority of 
shareholders by the majority. The Principle therefore should 
    29 
 
derogate from the usual position of majority rule for decision 
making by shareholders; 
 
3. non-shareholder stakeholders should be able to argue that the 
Principle applied if all of the shareholders have acted in a way 
which made such stakeholders believe that the usual default rule 
has been waived. Shareholders should not be able to rely on 
internal formality that they have ignored in order to avoid a form 
of action that they consented or acquiesced to. This approach also 
opens the possibility for third parties to use the Principle as a way 
to enforce decisions of all of the shareholders against a specific 
company; and 
 
4. any rule, whether a rule of substance or procedure, which exists 
for the benefit of creditors should either be a default rule which 
can be waived by them (which would take such a rule outside the 
scope of this thesis) or be a mandatory rule. Therefore the 
Principle should not apply to situations where a rule is designed to 
protect non-shareholder stakeholders, 
 
in other words, the Principle should be objectively applied, require 
unanimity of shareholders and should be able to apply in every 
circumstance of corporate decision making other than in respect of rules 
which are designed for the protection of other parties than shareholders. 
 
2.7. LAW AND EQUITY 
English law has historically recognised a difference between the common 
law and equity; a difference between principles of substantive rules and 
ensuring that those rules are applied equitably.79 In England two parallel 
sets of courts developed, one for the law and one for equitable principles, 
                                                     
79John McGhee QC (ed) Snell's Equity (33rd  edn, Sweet and Maxwell, 2016) ("Snell") para 1-
002. 
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which were only unified into one unified judicial system by the Judicature 
Acts 1873 and 1875.80 It has been said that: 
 
"In its most general sense, equity refers to a conception of justice 
that transcends the substantive and procedural rules of the positive 
law."81 
 
Over time, this "came to mean an ethical standard that the defendant would 
be held to when he enforced his common law rights."82 Ultimately, if there 
was a conflict between the common law and equity, the rules of equity are 
to prevail.83 Equity can thus be seen as a "gloss" on the law.84 It has been 
used to over-ride any lack of formality required by the common law.85  
Whilst there are several maxims and doctrines of equity that survive today, 
the most relevant for examination of the Principle is that "equity looks to 
the intent rather than the form".86 Thus the opinion has been advanced 
that: 
"Courts of Equity make a distinction in all cases between that which 
is matter of substance and that which is matter of form; and if it 
finds that by insisting on the form, the substance will be defeated, it 
holds it to be inequitable to allow a person to insist on such form, 
and thereby defeat the substance."87 
 
It should be noted that, should a court apply an equitable remedy, this does 
not mean that the formalities will necessarily be deemed to be complied 
with, but instead the court could find an equivalent remedy for the relevant 
party.88 It should also be noted that Scots law does not acknowledge the 
                                                     
80 For an overview of the history of equity under English law, see Snell, ibid paras 1-006 - 1-
107  
81 Snell, ibid, para 1-002 
82 Snell, ibid, para 1-009. 
83 Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 s25(11) 
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concept of "equity", however frequently uses its own routes to achieve a 
similar end.89 
  
                                                     
89 Eg George L Gretton, 'Trusts without Equity' (2000)  49(3) The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 599 
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3. HISTORY OF THE PRINCIPLE UNDER UK LAW 
Having reviewed the normative basis for a company and corporate 
governance, it is necessary to examine the history and development of the 
Principle as applied by the UK courts. 
 
3.1. ORIGINS: SALOMON? 
As with much modern company law, the Principle appears first in Salomon v 
Salomon & Co.90 This case not only established the concept of the veil of 
incorporation,91 but according to Grantham92 laid the foundations for the 
Principle. The facts of Salomon are very well rehearsed. Aron Salomon was a 
sole trader who sold his business to a private limited company".93 This new 
company was incorporated under the Companies Act 1862, which required 
that there be at least 7 shareholders94 of any company. It was incorporated 
with an authorised share capital of 40,000 shares of 1l each, of which 20,007 
were ultimately issued. Aron Salomon held 20,001 shares himself, with each 
of "his wife, a daughter, and four sons, each of them subscribing for one 
share".95 The vast majority of voting, control and economic rights were held 
by one individual, being the individual who sold the business to such 
company in the first instance. The business faced financial difficulties, 
became insolvent and entered liquidation. The assets of the company were 
insufficient to meet all the ordinary creditors of the company in full, but 
there were sufficient assets to meet secured creditors in full (including Aron 
Salomon, who held various debentures issued by the company). The matter 
before the House of Lords was whether the company was a true company or 
whether its incorporation was a: 
 
"mere scheme to enable [Aron Salomon] to carry on business in the 
name of a company with limited liability."96 
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The 1890s was a fertile time for the development of company law in the UK. 
Parliament had commissioned a committee lead by Lord Davey (the “Davey 
Committee”) which issued a report (the “Davey Report”).97 The Davey 
Committee noted the tendency for established businesses of sole traders or 
partnerships to be incorporated into companies, both in positions of good 
faith and in situations of “the eve of bankruptcy”.98 The Davey Committee 
recommended that the law did not need to be updated.99 However, they 
only did so on the basis of the Salomon judgments that had been delivered 
up to the Davey Report, being up to the Court of Appeal. The Court of 
Appeal in the Salomon case held that “incorporation would be upheld unless 
a company was established for an illegitimate purpose”,100 and that the 
company in Salomon had been created for an illegitimate purpose, being to 
ensure that Aron Salomon was not personally liable for the debts of the 
business.  At the time that the Davey Committee was deliberating, it was 
presumed that the courts would hold a company as not validly incorporated 
if it was only incorporated to take advantage of the protections of limited 
liability for shareholders. Watson hints that the Davey Committee and the 
Court of Appeal in Salomon represent good examples of State Gift theory, as 
the state is enquiring into the purposes of a particular company and 
establishing whether to approve it.101 The Davey Committee stated: “It is 
further suggested that persons conspiring to defraud by means of such 
devices as described in Aron Salomon’s case are amenable to the criminal 
law”.102 The Davey Report recommended that, for the first time under UK 
corporate law, protections be introduced for creditors against fraudulent 
preferences and disposals.103 It is clear that the Davey Committee believed 
that the transactions in Salomon would fall within these categories of 
challengeable transaction. So when the Davey Committee: 
                                                     
97 Report of the Departmental Committee appointed by the Board of Trade to inquire what 
amendments are necessary in the acts relating to joint stock companies incorporated with 
limited liability under the Companies Acts 1862 to 1890, 1895 Command Paper c.7779 
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100 Broderip v Salomon, [1895] 2 Ch. 323  
101 Watson (n14) 134 
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“dismissed from their consideration every suggestion for a public 
inquiry by the registrar or other official authority into the 
soundness, good faith, and prospects of the undertaking at this or 
any other stage of a company’s formation”,104 
 
they did so because such inquiry was unnecessary: the court would 
ultimately fulfil this role, as in the Salomon case so far. In the mid 1890s 
State Gift theory was dominant, but the courts were already fulfilling the 
role of the state in examining whether companies were legitimate or not. If 
the courts were not fulfilling such a role, the Davey Report 
recommendations may well have been different and legislative change may 
have been proposed to re-inforce the State Gift nature of a company. 
Indeed, Watson suggests that: 
 
“Part of the sanguinity of the Davey Committee may have been 
brought about by a belief that the Court of Appeal judgments in 
Salomon would not be overturned by the House of Lords. Indeed the 
Committee appended the judgments of the Court of Appeal to the 
Report. The Davey Committee therefore clearly endorsed Lord 
Lindley’s view in the Court of Appeal in Salomon that incorporation 
would be upheld unless a company was established for an 
illegitimate purpose.”105 
 
If courts kept doing so, this would in turn increase the ability for creditors 
to challenge the actions of a company and result in shareholders being 
personally liable for the debts of the company, which would undermine 
shareholders; claim to be the supreme constituency of a company, thus 
limiting the application of the Principle. The “illegitimate purposes” that 
the Salomon company was established for was considered by the Davey 
Committee and Court of Appeal to be utilising limited liability to avoid 
personal liability for the dominant shareholder.  
 
Their lordships, however, threw aside this entire conceptual framework and 
held that the company was duly formed and that, being solvent at the time 
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that it acquired the business for good value, there was no basis on which to 
hold Aron Salomon as personally liable for the debts of the company. The 
Davey Report conclusion that no state entity needed to inquire into the good 
faith purposes of the establishment of a close company was predicated on 
the fact that this was unnecessary as the court (ie a public body) was 
already doing so. Therefore, by their lordships deciding that this was not a 
decision for the court, they removed the court from performing this role 
just after a serious opportunity to strengthen the role of the state was 
rejected as not being necessary: the House of Lords collapsed the State Gift 
edifice of the 1890s. By arguing that, effectively, all creditors of the 
Salomon company knew that it was a limited liability company and therefore 
incorporating to utilise limited liability could not be held to be an improper 
purpose,106 they reduced the state’s ability to regulate the purposes for 
which companies are established, other than in cases such as fraud or other 
pure criminal conduct. As State Gift theory relies on an argument that the 
state should regulate the purposes of companies, Salomon provided a strong 
victory to Contractarians. Further, by narrowing the circumstances in which 
creditors are able to challenge actions of companies when dealing with 
shareholders, the House of Lords provided a victory to Shareholder Value 
theorists and, in turn Shareholder Primacy thinkers. Therefore Salomon laid 
the groundwork for strong and widespread application of the Principle. 
 
Grantham cites the judicial history of the Principle as originating from the 
dictum of Lord Davey107 in Salomon: 
 
"I think it an inevitable inference from the circumstances of the case 
that every member of the company assented to the purchase, and 
the company is bound in a matter intra vires by the unanimous 
agreement of its members."108 
 
This formulation is wide and purports to provide the members acting 
unanimously the power to make decisions they would not be able to in 
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general meeting (for example, in respect of powers expressly delegated to 
the board of directors in the articles). This is a Contractarian analysis, as it 
acknowledges that shareholders can vary the underlying corporate contract 
and removes any role for the state other than in setting the boundaries for 
intra vires actions (which their lordships set very widely). It was a victory 
for Shareholder Primacy as it enabled the shareholders to bind the company 
entirely. Based on this isolated quote alone the Principle should have almost 
universal application so long as the company is able to undertake the action 
that the shareholders wish. 
 
The phrase "from the circumstances of the case", however, may mean that 
Lord Davey did not intend to make a fundamental statement about the law 
in general, but instead limited his analysis to the individual circumstances, 
where there was commonality between directors and shareholders and Aron 
Salomon made decisions.109 This thesis has explained different agency costs 
and protections arise between Berle/Means Companies and closely held 
companies. It is no surprise that, when dealing with close companies, a 
more Contractarian line of reasoning is followed.  
 
Grantham suggests that Salomon was a "fundamental paradigm shift"110 as 
this decision "radically reformulated the corporate concept",111 as prior to 
Salomon, "genuine partnership was, therefore, a prerequisite to 
incorporation, both legally and historically",112 whereas this changed by the 
House of Lords holding that a company was valid where only one individual 
was an "active participant".113  Grantham cites Sir Frederick Pollock, who at 
the time of Salomon opined that when the drafters of the relevant 
legislation: 
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110 Ross Grantham, 'The doctrinal basis of the rights of company shares holders' (1998) 57(3) 
The Cambridge Law Journal 554, 561 
111 ibid 
112 Ibid. This thesis views company law as a hybrid between partnership law and the law of 
Corporations 
113 ibid 
    37 
 
"spoke of seven or more persons being ‘associated’, they meant such 
an association as, without the help of the statute, would have made 
those persons members of an ordinary partnership."114 
 
Grantham and Pollock's analysis is that the Salomon arrangements would not 
have been a valid ordinary partnership (if purporting to be so), and so the 
court changed what would be held to be a valid company by the Salomon 
ruling.  The offending elements of the Salomon arrangements appear to be 
the unequal distribution of profit and voting rights, and that several of the 
shareholders were effectively silent partners who were not involved in the 
running of the business. However, neither of these is fatal to the 
constitution of an ordinary partnership. The definition of a partnership 
under the Partnership Act of 1890 is: 
 
"the relation which subsists between persons carrying on a business 
in common with a view of profit."115  
 
There is no requirement for an equal share of profits, in fact it is uncertain 
whether a division of profits is required at all to constitute a partnership,116 
and courts have expressly acknowledged that dormant partners still qualify 
as partners.117 Accordingly the Salomon relationship would have constituted 
a valid partnership if it purported to be such, and therefore the importance 
of the Salomon decision was to provide a victory for Contractarians over 
State Gift theorists. This had several linked effects –  as well as 
strengthening, ultimately, the position of shareholders within the company, 
we have seen that Contractarians look to partnership law for the basis of 
companies. Accordingly, the House of Lords in Salomon provides a boost to 
those who believe that company law, including corporate decision making, 
evolved from the private law of partnerships. 
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The Partnership Act 1890 provided a set of default provisions, and it remains 
usual for partnerships to enter into agreements to vary these rules.118 The 
Partnership Act states: 
 
"the mutual rights and duties of partners, whether ascertained by 
agreement or defined by this Act, may be varied by the consent of 
all the partners, and such consent may be either express or inferred 
from a course of dealing."119 
 
In respect of this provision, Lindley & Banks state "it goes without saying 
that no variation will be effective if consent of all the partners is not 
forthcoming."120 It is arguable that the Principle shares at least a common 
root with this provision; the concept of those who contribute equity capital 
to a business venture unanimously deciding a course of action, and such 
course of action binding that business venture.   
 
The rationale for the Principle being strong is clear cut for partnerships. In a 
partnership, each partner is under joint unlimited liability for the debts of 
the partnership,121 the firm itself has no separate legal personality unless 
located in Scotland122 and there are general fiduciary duties owed by 
partners to the partnership.123 Whilst individual partners risk agency costs 
from the actions of their partners, the unity of management with equity 
contributors mean that the risk of self dealing by management is removed. 
Similarly, any third party interacting with the partnership has recourse to 
the personal assets of all partners.  Ownership and control vest in the same 
people for partnerships, whereas in companies ownership is vested in the 
shareholders whereas control is vested in the directors.124 The analysis in 
Salomon is slightly confused by the fact that the position of the board of 
directors was unclear. Lord Watson stated that despite averments to the 
contrary:  
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"No evidence was led tending to support the allegation that no board 
of directors was ever appointed, or that the board consisted entirely 
of the appellant"125 
 
It is unclear whether Salomon would have resulted in the same outcome (or 
contain such wide-ranging statements of law) if a board of directors existed 
yet were not consulted in respect of the transactions in question.  
 
Salomon demonstrates a fundamental shift in the characteristics of a 
company. By providing victory to Contractarians and in turn Shareholder 
Primacists, the Principle should have strong and universal application. 
However, it is unclear whether the dictum by Lord Davey was intended for 
universal application or whether it was limited to the specific facts. Whilst 
all parties agreed that the key corporate actor in this situation was Aron 
Salomon, it remains unclear in what capacity his dominance arises-  he was 
dominant shareholder, secured creditor and possibly a director of the 
company. Accordingly, whilst Salomon creates a useful starting point for the 
application of the Principle, it raises as many questions as it provides 
answers. 
 
3.2. EARLY DEVELOPMENT – A ROCKY ROAD 
Initially, it was unclear whether Lord Davey's dictum in Salomon would be 
considered to be a general statement of law, or whether it was more likely 
that Salomon would be considered as fact specific and an alternative line of 
analysis followed. The case of In Re George Newman & Co126 involved a 
company which acquired the assets of a builder (George Newman) and gave 
"presents"127 to its chairman (the same George Newman) using funds it had 
borrowed at a time when it was insolvent, and it subsequently entered 
liquidation proceedings. The presents were approved by all directors and all 
shareholders, but the liquidator sought recovery of the presents (amongst 
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other payments) from George Newman on the grounds that transferring the 
funds was an ultra vires act, and accordingly the shareholders could not 
ratify it.128  Lindley L.J. agreed, stating: 
 
"The shareholders, at a meeting duly convened for the purpose, can, 
if they think proper, remunerate directors for their trouble or make 
presents to them for their services out of assets properly divisible 
amongst the shareholders themselves. Further, if the company is a 
going concern, the majority can bind the minority in such a matter as 
this. But to make presents out of profits is one thing and to make 
them out of capital or out of money borrowed by the company is a 
very different matter. Such money cannot be lawfully divided 
amongst the shareholders themselves, nor can it be given away by 
them for nothing to their directors so as to bind the company in its 
corporate capacity."129  
 
Lindley L.J. views the 'presents' as maintenance of capital issue, 
notwithstanding that the 'presents' were made to directors, and so required 
restitution by George Newman for this alone. However, he went on to state: 
 
"But even if the shareholders in general meeting could have 
sanctioned the making of these presents, no general meeting to 
consider the subject was ever held. It may be true, and probably is 
true, that a meeting, if held, would have done anything which Mr. 
George Newman desired; but this is pure speculation, and the 
liquidator, as representing the company in its corporate capacity, is 
entitled to insist upon and to have the benefit of the fact that even 
if a general meeting could have sanctioned what was done, such 
sanction was never obtained. Individual assents given separately may 
preclude those who give them from complaining of what they have 
sanctioned; but for the purpose of binding a company in its corporate 
capacity individual assents given separately are not equivalent to the 
assent of a meeting. The company is entitled to the protection 
afforded by a duly convened meeting, and by a resolution properly 
considered and carried and duly recorded."130 
 
Even if the specific facts of George Newman were intra vires, Lindley L.J. 
would still not hold that the presents were valid. Implicit within this 
reasoning is a separation between merely giving assent and giving 
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considered agreement to a provision. This is the first case to reject the 
Principle and did so because of a mandatory rule for formality. It is implicit 
that rejecting the application of the Principle may not necessarily be a bad 
thing for shareholders, as requiring debate may empower them. 
Accordingly, for Lindley L.J., the only application of the Principle was to 
estop any individual shareholder who had given their consent from 
"complaining what they have sanctioned",131 but the assent of all 
shareholders could never equate to a decision taken at a general meeting. 
Lindley L.J. focuses on the rights of a liquidator to rely on formality, which 
is valid because the company was insolvent at the time that the "presents" 
were given, and therefore the interests of the company ceased to be solely 
those of the shareholders. 
 
Whilst the outcome in Salomon and George Newman was different, there is 
consistency in the underlying reasoning – a form of Shareholder Primacy: 
Salomon by the court refusing to review the underlying decision made by 
the shareholders, and George Newman by using formality to defend the 
rights of minority shareholders. Salomon was decided by the House of Lords 
after George Newman, and therefore on issues which overlap the two cases, 
Salomon is binding. 
 
In In re Express Engineering Works, Limited132 it was argued that George 
Newman meant that "[f]or the purpose of binding a company in its 
corporate capacity the mere individual assent of the corporators does not 
take the place of a resolution properly passed at a duly constituted 
meeting".133 Lord Sterndale held that there had been a meeting of all 
shareholders, albeit that it purported to be a board meeting as there was 
commonality between shareholders and directors, and that this would have 
been a valid general meeting if purported to be such. Accordingly, following 
Lord Davey's dictum, the Principle must apply.134 Younger L.J. went further: 
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"I agree with the view that when all the shareholders of a company 
are present at a meeting that becomes a general meeting and there 
is no necessity for any further formality to be observed to make it 
so. In my opinion the true view is that if you have all the 
shareholders present, then all the requirements in connection with a 
meeting of the company are observed"135 
 
Express Engineering has been cited136 as establishing the primacy of the 
Salomon dicta over the George Newman position, but this quote is of 
greater significance. The three cases cited so far all involved liquidators 
challenging transactions that close companies unanimously resolved to do –
the shareholders themselves were those arguing that the Principle should 
apply, albeit often in different capacities to avoid personal liability. 
Younger L.J.'s dictum is not that when all shareholders are together it is 
open to them to argue that they are meeting as a general meeting, but 
rather their assembly automatically becomes so. Accordingly, despite 
superficially empowering shareholders by avoiding the claims of the 
liquidator, this is the start of a line of analysis which results in the Principle 
being used against shareholders as well as by them.  Express Engineering 
still required a meeting, which remained the case until Parker & Cooper, 
Limited v Reading.137 In this case, debentures had been issued to a 
shareholder in exchange for the provision of funding. After the Company 
went into liquidation, the liquidator raised proceedings to set the 
debentures aside for lack of adherence to procedural formalities. Astbury J. 
characterised the case as follows:  
 
"The company had the benefit of the money. The debenture was 
issued with the assent of every shareholder, and the question is 
whether the plaintiffs, or rather the liquidator, ought to succeed in 
obtaining a declaration that the debenture and the resolution 
authorizing it were inoperative and invalid, so that the creditors may 
get the advantage of the defendant Reading's 1750l. and deprive him 
of the security on which he made that advance. 
 
                                                     
135 Ibid 471 
136 E.g. Ellis (n4) 60 
137 Parker & Cooper, Limited v Reading [1926] Ch. 975 
    43 
 
Unless I am bound by authority to give this relief I certainly do not 
propose to do so."138 
 
Astbury J. only intended to hold that the debentures were not valid if faced 
with no other possibility. He then considered Salomon, George Newman and 
Express Engineering, before concluding that: 
 
"I cannot think that they came to their decision because the five 
shareholders happened to meet together in one room or one place, 
as distinct from agreeing to the transaction inter se in such manner 
as they thought fit… where the transaction is intra vires and honest, 
and especially if it is for the benefit of the company, it cannot be 
upset if the assent of all the corporators is given to it. I do not think 
it matters in the least whether that assent is given at different 
times or simultaneously."139 
 
This meant that the debentures granted in exchange for a bona fide 
injection of funds were validly granted. Given Astbury J.'s earlier position, 
this is unsurprising. When coupled with Express Engineering, however, this 
created a potentially dangerous position for shareholders. Whilst their 
ability to direct the actions of the company informally was increased, so was 
the risk that they could accidentally do so. Not only was it held (in Express 
Engineering) that whenever shareholders meet in any capacity it is always a 
shareholders meeting, following Parker & Cooper v Reading they did not 
even meet to do so. This risks shareholders being retrospectively held to 
have agreed to a course of action that a company takes without realising at 
the time that they did so. By the 1920s, the Salomon approach had become 
settled law with a victory for Contractarians and Shareholder Primacists, 
with an emphasis on shareholders' ability to waive formality in decision 
making. The cases have involved both binding the company to third parties, 
and waiving internal procedural requirements. The test developing was 
merely whether the proposed act was intra vires or not, with judiciary 
actively looking to hold a course of action as being so if the company 
received a benefit as part of the transaction.  
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“For a number of years there were no cases of real import on this 
matter”.140 This changed with the case after which the Principle is 
commonly named, being In re Duomatic Limited,141 which involved a 
challenge by a liquidator of a company of payments made to various 
directors. Initially there were three directors, who were all ordinary 
shareholders. There was also a preference shareholder (“Dutchco”) who 
was not entitled to vote. One of the directors (“H”) was not fulfilling his 
duties. The other directors agreed to pay him £4,000 to resign and transfer 
his shares to one of the other directors.142  There were further changes to 
the directors and shareholders. After the addition of new shareholders, one 
of the directors (“E”) agreed to only draw remuneration at £60 per week, 
but drew far more. When the company entered insolvency, the liquidator 
challenged various payments made by the company as breaching the articles 
of association (which required approval of director remuneration by ordinary 
resolution), and that the arrangements had not been disclosed to the 
shareholders of the company (ie Dutchco was unaware of the 
arrangements). Dutchco was a shareholder but was not entitled to vote or 
attend meetings. Preference shares are a grey area in the analysis 
conducted so far as they have a wide range of potential characteristics. 
Preference shares with a fully fixed, cumulative return are effectively debt 
instruments as they enjoy no marginal increase in claim or value as the 
company gains success.143 On the other hand, preference shares which have 
a right to receive equity returns or value on a wind up have a marginal 
increase.144 With potential additional complications of different rights 
arising on dividends and on winding up and voting rights, it is impossible to 
conclude where preference shares should fit into the normative framework 
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for corporate decision making, and whether the holders are “shareholders” 
or other constituents when it comes to examining theory and the Principle. 
Unfortunately, the case report for Duomatic does not outline the rights 
attaching to Dutchco's shares and so makes it hard to examine how 
Duomatic should have been decided. This is unfortunate, as if Dutchco was a 
“pure economic shareholder” then the Principle should not have applied as 
there are agency costs arising from the majority ordinary shareholders 
waiving formality – whereas if Dutchco was effectively a debt stakeholder 
then the Principle should be able to apply without Dutchco needing to have 
decision making rights or even being informed.145 
 
 The liquidator’s barrister argued that the authorities “establish that the 
unanimous consent of the corporators may bind a company as effectively as 
a formal resolution. In this case there was a holder of preference shares who 
did not consent”,146 failing which the lack of disclosure of payment to all 
shareholders should invalidate the payments. This may have been a tactical 
mistake. Had he pled that the payments were ultra vires given the financial 
position of the company (a George Newman approach) then the judgement 
may have been different, and perhaps more limiting on the application of 
the Principle. In respect of the first ground, Buckley J. formulated the 
Principle in its most famous iteration: 
 
“where it can be shown that all shareholders who have a right to 
attend and vote at a general meeting of the company assent to some 
matter which a general meeting of the company could carry into 




Buckley J. elaborated further: 
 
“The preference shareholder, having shares which conferred upon 
him no right to receive notice of or to attend and vote at a general 
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meeting of the company, could be in no worse position if the matter 
were dealt with informally by agreement between all the 
shareholders having voting rights than he would be if the 
shareholders met together in a duly constituted meeting”148 
 
These statements provide a limitation to the Principle. They emphasise 
examining whether the general meeting of the company can effect the 
resolution so proposed. It has been generally held that the division of power 
between the board of directors and the shareholders is a matter for 
construction of the articles of association of such company.149 This 
formulation weakens the Principle, as to invoke it means there must be 
some ability for the shareholders’ to undertake this course of action 
contained in the company's articles. This clashes with normative position 
that we would expect the Principle to embody, which would be to empower 
the shareholders to make any decision on behalf of the company. 
Accordingly, the formulation of the Principle in Duomatic narrowed its 
application to the actions of a general meeting rather than any clear ability 
to bind the company, and re-focused the Principle to situations where 
resolutions would be valid at general meetings. This in turn provided a boost 
to those who adhere to Bainbridge’s director primacy, and so curtailed the 
rights of shareholders to deploy the Principle in general terms. This 
provided considerable clarity to the category of actors who require to 
consent for operation of the Principle – only those who are entitled to 
receive notice of and vote at general meetings. In other words, Duomatic 
subtly changed the application of the Principle further from unanimity of 
the corporators,150 to unanimous action of those shareholders who can vote. 
Duomatic changed the Principle from being of wide application, to being a 
way to hold an informal general meeting of the company. 
 
Based on this formulation, it was clear that E had to repay amounts received 
in excess of £60 per week since that level of remuneration was agreed. It 
would appear to validate the £4,000 payment to H as Dutchco could not 
                                                     
148 ibid 
149 Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw [1935] 2 K.B. 113, CA 
150 Which had generally been undefined in previous cases 
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vote and all other shareholders approved the payment. The relevant section 
of the Companies Act 1948 (section 191), however, required not just 
approval by the company of payments for compensation but also the details 
being “disclosed to members of the company”. Buckley J., therefore, 
ordered H to repay £4,000 to the company, stating: 
 
“That section must, I think, require disclosure to all members of the 
company, and it must require disclosure while the payment is still a 
proposed payment, that is to say, before the payment is made; and 
it further requires that the proposal be approved by the company, 
which must, I think, mean the company in general meeting. 
  
In the present case it is clear that no particulars of this payment of 
£4,000 were, before the date that the payment was made, given to 
all members of the company, for no such disclosure was at any time 
made to the preference shareholder. There would, I think, be good 
reason for making such disclosure to him, notwithstanding that he 
would have no right to attend any general meeting convened for the 
purpose of approving the payment, because although he was not, by 
virtue of his preference shareholding, entitled to receive notice of 
general meetings or attend and vote at them, he might nevertheless 
wish to make his views known to those who would attend and vote at 
the general meeting, and therefore notice to him of the proposal to 
make the payment might well be a matter of some importance to 
him and of some ultimate consequence in the affairs of the 
company.”151 
 
This contradicts his previous logic: in Dutchco could have been in “no worse 
position” by informal decision making, but also were entitled to receive 
disclosure of the proposed transaction in case they would have made their 
view known to voting shareholders. H had to repay the amounts advanced to 
him when all who were entitled to had decided that he should be entitled to 
it, in a situation where statute was not explicit as to whether all members 
required prior disclosure or not. The decision is guidance that the Principle 
may not apply where there is an express statutory requirement that 
precludes it. In Duomatic, the statutory requirement to give disclosure to 
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(arguably) all members152 meant that the putative application of the 
Principle was thwarted, despite being ostensibly held to apply. 
 
It has been stated that Buckley J. “sidestepped the inconsistencies in the 
previous authorities”.153 He sidestepped widespread application of the 
Principle, as the lack of disclosure invalidated the shareholder decision 
making.  We cannot verify whether Dutchco should have been normatively 
included or excluded from the shareholder base for unanimity purposes. The 
court should be keen to ensure that genuine unanimity of members has been 
achieved in order to avoid potential agency costs by the majority on the 
minority. In order to do so, where there is any grey area, the court should 
therefore be keen to deny application of the Principle. Accordingly the 
outcome in Duomatic matches the normative framework outlined so far. 
However, the rationale for arriving at this outcome seems unsatisfactory – 
Buckley J. excluded Dutchco for certain purposes and included them for 
others, and in doing so contradicted his own logic.  
 
Nevertheless, Buckley J.’s formulation of the Principle has become the 
defining test for its application.154 
 
3.4. POST DUOMATIC 
The narrower interpretation of the Principle developed relatively 
widespread application and judicial acceptance. In Cane v Jones,155 two 
sides of a family had 50% each of the shares in a family company, and fell 
out. The articles held that the chairman of the board of directors had a 
casting vote at a meeting of directors, but a prior shareholders' agreement 
disapplied this provision. Shareholders had subsequently changed (still with 
each side of the family holding 50% of the shares each), with the question 
being whether the agreement, by application of the Principle, had varied 
                                                     
152 Which, if there were no preference shareholders, would be an identical process to the 
application of the Principle 
153 Ellis (n4) 263 
154 eg EIC Services Ltd v Phipps, [2004] 2 B.C.L.C. 589  
155 [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1451 
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the articles or whether it was a contractual arrangement which did not bind 
successor shareholders. Wheeler QC held that it did not matter: either the 
Principle applied and therefore the articles were changed, or alternatively 
the agreement overrode the articles and, due to its terms, bound the 
current shareholders – in either case the agreement trumped the articles. 
This judgement meant that the complex issue of registrations with the 
Registrar of Companies was avoided. 
 
Not all judicial treatment of the Duomatic iteration has been favourable. In 
In re Barry Artist Ltd,156 the company petitioned for a reduction of capital 
and cancellation of its share premium account despite no special resolution 
being passed as required under the Companies Act 1948 – instead all 
shareholders had signed a written resolution (which was not an acceptable 
procedure). Nourse J. stated that other than this the petition was 
“unobjectionable and ought to succeed”,157 but as well as the company 
decision, the court had to approve the reduction and had discretion to do 
so. He was critical of the company adopting a written resolution, and 
stated: 
 
“The court has never before been asked to document a reduction 
which the company has effected or purported to effect otherwise 
than by way of special resolution. It seems to me to be most 
undesirable that a settled practice of many years’ standing should be 
disturbed… it has been represented to me that the company chose to 
proceed as it has, not in order to test out whether it could proceed 
in this way, but because it was advised that it could and because it 
was thought to be more convenient to do so. I will accept that that 
was the case, although I desire to say that the one and a half hours 
which it took to argue the point last Wednesday did not suit the 
convenience of the court… My strong inclination has been to adjourn 
this petition so that a meeting can be held and a special resolution 
passed, but it has been represented to me that the company has a 
good reason… for having the reduction confirmed before the end of 
this term. In the circumstances, although with great reluctance, I am 
prepared to accede to the petition today. I would not be prepared to 
do so in any similar case in the future.”158 
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The court acknowledged the presence of the Principle but was not keen on 
its application in the Duomatic formulation. Had Barry Artist Ltd not had 
good reason for the reduction to be confirmed in short order, it seems likely 
that this attempt to rely on the correct legal application of the Principle 
would have resulted in the court rejecting a petition it otherwise would 
have accepted. This is the opposite of the approach taken by Astbury J. in 
Parker & Cooper Limited, which very strongly emphasised the just outcome 
in the case before him. This represents a development in judicial attitudes 
which has resulted in the court taking a much more hesitant attitude to the 
Principle than was shown in the early days of its development: the court 
reviewed the merits of the case. 
 
During the 1980s the limitations of the Principle were explored more fully. 
Thus, attempts to utilise the Principle to defend an action by a liquidator to 
recover a dividend that was unlawfully paid was rejected as unlawful 
distribution rules were for the benefit of the creditors and so could not be 
waived by the shareholders.159 This matches the normative grounds for 
rejection of the application of the Principle. 
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4. ELEMENTS OF THE MODERN TEST OF THE PRINCIPLE 
The modern application of the Principle comprises a two stage test – firstly, 
is the Principle capable of applying to a particular situation; secondly, did 
the Principle actually apply that situation.160  
 
4.1. SCOPE 
4.1.1. FUNDAMENTAL TEST 
The first element is the "scope" of the Principle. The basic test was 
contained in Atlas Wright (Europe) Ltd v Wright & Anor.161 This case 
involved a long term service contract with a Mr Wright, who sold his 
majority stake in Wright Air Conditioning Limited (“WACL”) to Wheway plc, 
and WACL became a wholly owned subsidiary of Wheway. The CEO of 
Wheway signed a contract appointing Mr Wright as President of WACL for 
life (although Mr Wright could terminate the arrangements on 6 months’ 
notice). Wheway complied until it sold the shares of WACL to Atlas Wright. 
The new directors of WACL decided to terminate the arrangement. When 
the arrangement was implemented, section 319 of the Companies Act 1985 
was in force which provided that a company could not enter into a service 
contract with a director for more than 5 years unless the shareholders had 
received 15 days’ written notice of the proposed term and approved it in 
general meeting, which had not happened. Atlas Wright tried to rely on s319 
to escape the contract. The Court of Appeal reviewed the white paper that 
proposed the wording of s319 at the start of their discussion of the 
judgment,162 showing a purposive approach. Despite the case of Re RW Peak 
(Kings Lynn) Limited163 (see discussion at 4.1.2 below) being decided as the 
case was being argued, the Court of Appeal held that when deciding 
whether the Principle should apply: 
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    52 
 
“each such provision requires to be examined on its merits against 
the criterion of underlying purposes. As already stated, in relation to 
s164 and the decision in Re RW Peak, there may well be good reasons 
for refusing to apply the Duomatic doctrine [i.e. the Principle] to a 
particular provision when its underlying purpose is examined.”164 
 
The Court of Appeal held that the Principle could only apply in situations 
where the rule to which the Principle was purportedly applied was for the 
benefit of the shareholders. This matches the normative provision for 
application of the Principle –that shareholders should have maximum 
freedom to unanimously waive rules which are exclusively for their benefit 
but should not be able to do so if the rule is for the benefit of others. In 
Atlas Wright the Court of Appeal held in respect of s319 that:  
 
“it does not seem to me to be plain that there is any statutory 
purpose underling the provisions of s319 (3) and (5) beyond the 
benefit and protection of the shareholders of the company… the 
underlying intention appears to me to be no more than to require 
unequivocal opportunity for the shareholders to consider the terms 
of the agreement approved… it seems to me no more than a ‘back 
up’ formality in the nature of a notice provision designed to ensure 
the opportunity for fully informed consent by the shareholders.  It is 
thus amendable to waiver by the class for whose protection it is 
designed.”165 
 
Accordingly, the Principle could apply to this situation. The effect of this is 
to prevent an argument by the company that it is not bound because it 
failed to adhere with statutory internal decision making processes. In Atlas 
Wright, this prevented the current shareholders from avoiding a contract 
that they did not want the company to be in.  
 
Establishing the beneficiaries of any particular rule is straightforward. Thus, 
the Principle can apply to ratification of breach of duties by shareholders to 
a company.166 Statutory procedures for removing directors have been held 
“at least in part” to be for the benefit of the director167 and therefore the 
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Principle cannot apply. Similarly, requirements in respect of financial 
information to be provided prior to a distribution,168 and limitations on 
unlawful distributions169 are for the benefit of creditors and therefore the 
Principle cannot apply. Conversely, the Principle applied to the requirement 
of shareholder approval for substantial property transactions.170 Similarly, a 
pension plan purchases by a company for a retiring director that ignored 
procedural rules was curable by the Principle.171 A taxonomy of the cases 
demonstrates the following in respect of the Principle: 
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Creditors X X 
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This neatly shows when the Principle is capable of application. However, 
there are some rules that it is difficult to identify the "purpose" of. 
 
4.1.2. BUYBACK CASES 
In Re Barry Artist Ltd showed the courts' hesitancy when applying the 
Principle to reductions of capital, rooted in company law’s traditional 
    56 
 
reticence to countenance returns on capital.172 The Companies Act 1985 
introduced detailed rules of substance and procedure when it came to a 
company approving a buyback of its own shares from capital without 
obtaining court approval to do so.173 Certain of these were summarised by 
Lindsay J in Re R W Peak (Kings Lynn) Ltd174 as being: 
 
“(1) The company must be authorised to purchase its own 
shares by its articles (s.162). 
 (2) Where, as here, the purchase is ‘off-market’ within the 
meaning of s. 163(1), then the purchase has to be pursuant to 
a contract which itself has to be approved in advance of the 
purchase (s. 164(1)). 
 (3) That contract has to be approved by a special resolution of 
the company before the contract is entered into (s.164(2)). 
 (4) That special resolution has to be such that it is either 
passed without the holder of the shares to be bought voting 
them or the case being that, even if he had done so, the 
resolution would have still have been passed as a special 
resolution (s. 164(5). 
 (5) Such a resolution is not effective to authorise the proposed 
contract unless a copy of the contract, if it is in writing, shall 
have been available for inspection by members of the 
company at its registered office for at least the preceding 15 
days before and at the meeting at which the restriction is 
passed (s.164(6)).”175 
 
These seem to be rules of procedure rather than substance. All require 
shareholder approval or prescribe time periods that shareholders have to 
receive information prior to making such decision, so all seem for the 
shareholders' benefit and therefore capable of application of the Principle. 
In addition to these procedural requirements, there was a requirement for 
directors of the company to confirm the company's ability to pay its debts as 
they fell due immediately after the buyback and likelihood of doing so for 
year afterwards.176 This test, that the company in question remain solvent 
after the buyback, is a rule of substance for the benefit of creditors and so 
the Principle should not apply to it. 
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In R W Peak a father (Ronald) and son (Nicholas) were the only two 
shareholders of the relevant company. Ronald retired, and it was agreed 
that the company would purchase Ronald’s shares. The transaction 
completed in 1991 and but did not meet the procedural rules set out by 
Lindsay J. above, despite: 
 
“common ground… that the transaction in 1991 could have been 
arranged so as to have occasioned no doubts as to its legality and 
efficacy”,177 
 
in other words, the rule for the benefit of the creditors was satisfied. In 
1996 Nicholas died. Ronald raised an action to rectify the register of 
members of the company to undo the buyback transaction on the grounds 
that this transaction had not complied with the requirements for share 
buybacks out of capital. This action should have failed for several reasons. 
Firstly, the rules ignored were for the benefit of shareholders, and were 
waived by them. Secondly, Ronald was party to the transaction and seemed 
content until Nicholas’ death – estopping himself from arguing that his 
contractual counterparty had not followed required procedure. There were 
subsequent proceedings to establish (as required under the Companies Act 
1985) whether granting Ronald’s motion for rectification would prejudice 
people who had not yet appeared before the court, however Lindsay J held 
that the Principle could not apply. Several reasons were given, including 
that the articles of the company did not allow redemption of shares. This 
does not follow Cane v Jones. Another reason given was that Nicholas had 
not signed the buyback agreement in his capacity as shareholder of the 
company. This does not follow Younger LJ’s analysis in Re Express 
Engineering Works Ltd: the two shareholders reached an agreement whilst 
together and therefore were a meeting automatically. Lindsay J went 
further: 
 
“I add that I would reject the applicability of the Duomatic principle 
even were I to assume in the defendant’s favour that there was no 
requirement for a specified and suitable alteration to have been duly 
made to the company’s articles prior to the contract and even if 
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Nicholas’s signature were properly to be regarded as an assent by 
him qua member rather than, as it could have been, by way, for 
example, of a director implementing a decision he was acceding to 
on the company’s behalf under the persuasion of his fellow-director 
and majority shareholder.”178 
 
Lindsay J does not elaborate why, and does not comment on the perverse 
results – Ronald set aside a transaction that he had signed up to (and which 
Lindsay J hinted he may have persuaded the company to accept) despite the 
company's objection. Lindsay J concluded: 
 
“In the circumstances it is not possible, in my view, to regard the 
provisions of s. 162 and 164, which ensure that time is afforded for a 
measured informed consideration by members of the wisdom or 
propriety of any proposed purchase, as merely procedural and for 
the benefit only of current members.”179 
 
This analysis is flawed: rules which exist solely for the benefit of 
shareholders should be capable of being waived by the current shareholders. 
The purpose of such formality is to minimize agency costs between 
shareholders and managers or the other shareholders, which cannot arise 
where there is commonality between the shareholders and the managers 
and where all shareholders agree, as in R W Peak. Provided compliance with 
the rules for the benefit of the creditors (i.e. the company remained 
solvent) then all other rules in this regime should be able to be subject to 
the Principle. The result in this case departed from the Principle as seen in 
Re Express Engineering Works Ltd and Parker & Cooper, Ltd – which 
rejected Lindsay J’s view that formality of meetings and time requirements 
were protections that the shareholders could not waive. Lindsay J also 
objected to the application of the Principle as the shareholders consented 
at the same time as the contract was entered into, rather than prior to as 
required under the statutory regime. This is also an incorrect conclusion. 
Accordingly, this decision seems to be an anomaly. R W Peak was decided 
during the Atlas Wright case, and Potter LJ discussed R W Peak, and 
concluded: 
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“it was logical in the case of Re R W Peak not to apply the Duomatic 
principle when it would have undermined the clear statutory purpose 
of s. 164(2) and 164(5), as well as the broader policy considerations 
of Chapter VII of Part V of the 1985 Act.”180 
 
This analysis sidestepped examining Lindsay J’s reasons for concluding that 
the purpose of the procedural aspects of this regime was to protect others 
than the current shareholders.  In R W Peak,  the company was trying to 
argue that the Principle applied, whereas in Atlas Wright it was a third 
party arguing the application of the Principle against the company. This 
creates a possibility that, rather than being a uniformly applied rule, its 
application depends in part on who is trying to argue the Principle's 
application. 
 
The decision in R W Peak has been gradually eroded. In BDG Roof-Bond Ltd v 
Douglas & Others,181 a company attempted to buyback shares out of 
distributable profits rather than out of capital. Due to a qualification by the 
auditors in the company's accounts, the court held against the buyback. 
However, Park J provided some comment on the applicability of the 
Principle to the buyback regime, particularly the requirement that the 
contract be available for inspection prior to being entered into: “[this 
section] is a provision designed solely for the benefit of shareholders. 
There is no element of creditor protection in it at all.”182 This conclusion is 
correct. However, it contradicts R W Peak – either these tests contain an 
element of creditor protection or they do not. It does not make sense for 
none of these procedural provisions have any element of creditor 
protection, but the procedural regime in aggregate having such. The 
company originally submitted that lack of compliance with this regime 
resulted in the buyback being invalid – but dropped this following Atlas 
Wright. Had the company continued pressing this submission, Park J would 
have held that the Principle prevented the company from making such a 
submission.  
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The confusion increased with Kinlan v Crimmin,183 where a liquidator of a 
company tried to recover from an ex-shareholder amounts paid to him under 
a share buyback that had not complied with the procedural regime. No 
copies of the buyback contract had been provided in advance to the 
shareholders, and the agreement of shareholders to the transaction had 
taken place at the same time as the contract was signed, rather than in 
advance as required under the regime. In this case Mr Sales (sitting as a 
deputy judge of the High Court) concluded that “everyone who attended 
the meeting on 26 January 2001 understood very well what the object of 
that meeting was (namely, to agree finally the terms of any enter into an 
agreement for Styleprint [the company] to purchase Mr Crimmin’s 
shares.”184 He was of the opinion that: 
 
“I should add that since the events at the meeting on 26 January 
2001 [when the buyback agreement was signed] really amounted to a 
composite transaction to review and approve the [buyback] 
Agreement, I would not have regarded it as fatal to this analysis 
even if the resolution had been signed immediately after the 
Agreement was signed, rather than the other way round…The 
provision in s 164(6)(a) [which required prior copies of the buyback 
agreement to be provided to shareholders] is, in my view, clearly one 
for the protection of the members of the company rather than third 
parties, and hence is capable of being waived by the relevant 
members entitled to vote if they are unanimously in agreement that 
adherence to its terms is not required. ”185 
 
This matches the analysis of this thesis. However, it contradicts R W Peak. 
Mr Sales attempted to distinguish the cases on the grounds that the R W 
Peak articles did not allow for share buybacks whereas the Kinlan v Crimmin 
articles of association did. In light of Cane v Jones and Lindsay J’s own 
opinion in R W Peak (which stated he would have concluded the same even 
if the articles did so), this seems tenuous. Mr Sales states: 
“In my view, in relation to the particular provisions referred to, the 
impact (if any) upon persons other than the current members of 
Styleprint would have been so marginal and indirect that waiver of 
the provisions which I have referred to by operation of the Duomatic 
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principle would in each case have been legitimate. In particular, so 
far as concerns creditors or future members, they would have been 
on notice from inspection of the resolution and the notice given to 
the Companies Registrar…and would have been in a position to assess 
Styleprint’s general financial position in the usual way by reference 
to its audited accounts filed from time to time.”186 
 
This goes further than the ‘purpose’ test. Mr Sales’ logic would mean that 
purpose was not the test for the Principle, but instead it was necessary to 
review the actual impact of the putative transaction on third parties: 
meaning an unlawful distribution was capable of being remedied by the 
Principle provided the relevant company did not enter insolvency. This 
miscategorises the initial test for the application of the Principle. 
Nevertheless, the majority of Mr Sales’ analysis matches the normative and 
historical approach to the Principle seen so far, even if it directly conflict 
with R W Peak. 
 
This conflict is acknowledged. In Peña v Dale187 a buyback was held invalid 
because the consideration was to be paid in instalments in breach of the 
substantive element of the regime.188 Behrens J stated: 
“[Counsel for the company] makes the point that no written 
memorandum of the terms of the repurchase was either sent to the 
members or available for inspection at its registered office for the 
15 days prescribed by section 164(6). Whilst the submission is 
factually correct it is far more difficult to argue that the effect of 
the breach is to render the repurchase void. The difficulty arises 
from the apparent conflict between the views of Lindsay J in Re RW 
Peak 9 as explained by Potter LJ in the Court of Appeal in Re Wright 
v At1as Wright 10 and the views of Park J in Bdg. Initially Mr Kosmin 
QC [counsel for the company] suggested that Park J cannot have been 
referred to the views of Lindsay J. However as Park J's judgment 
contains quotations from the judgment of Potter LJ where the 
judgment of Lindsay J is quoted at some length that seems unlikely. 
 
Despite the very full and helpful submissions on the point from Mr 
Kosmin QC and Mr Bannister QC, I think that the resolution of the 
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conflict between the two views should be left to a case when it is 
determinative of the outcome.”189 
 
This matter was determinative of the outcome in the case of Dashfield v 
Davidson.190 This case involved a company with 3 shareholders, which was 
being sold. Due to previous experience, one shareholder wished to ensure 
that the death of a shareholder did not cause the company lapsing into 
inertia. Accordingly, a new article (“Article 14”) was inserted into the 
articles which provided that if a shareholder died, their shares would be 
bought back, valued by the most recent audited accounts of the company, 
failing which offered pre-emptively. The  shareholders agreed to a sale of 
the company (“Crown”), but during negotiations one shareholder died, prior 
to the publication of effectively finalised audited accounts. The company 
had traded strongly over that year, and therefore if these were utilised for 
the buyback calculation then the shares would be worth more. Completion 
mechanics of the sale of Crown included a buyback of the deceased 
shareholder's shares at completion and the purchase price being reduced 
accordingly. The balancing payment was held in escrow pending 
determination of the price to be paid to the estate of the deceased 
shareholder. One of the issues before the court was: 
“whether…By reason that all the members of Crown agreed to the 
amendment of Article 14 the formalities requisite for compliance 
with Section 164(2) of [the Companies Act 1985] were deemed to 
have been complied with the Duomatic Principle”.191 
 
McCahill J reviewed the judicial history of the Principle: 
“There are, no doubt, limits to the applicability of the Duomatic 
principle. No doubt it would have to yield to a fundamental 
requirement imposed by statute. The difficulty lies in identifying 
such fundamental principles. Moreover, the principle could not be 
used to validate non-compliance with a provision or requirement 
which was not exclusively for the benefit of those who in fact 
assented.”192 
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McCahill J treated these as two separate tests: they are, instead, part of 
one test – a ‘fundamental requirement’ is any rule which is not exclusively 
for the benefit of the shareholders (regardless of whether imposed by 
statute or not). In discussing R W Peak, McCahill J thought it not clear what 
constitutes the ratio of the case and what is obiter. He noted two potential 
views of the case – it was an ‘anomaly’, or the buyback rules were for the 
benefit of only the current members.193 He ultimately concluded that the 
true ratio of the case was the anomaly argument and therefore fact 
specific.194 
 
McCahill J explained the conflict noted above between R W Peak and BDG 
Roof: 
“If the protections afforded by Section 164(2) to (7) did provide 
some public interest or creditor protection, then each of the 
provisions should have been regarded in this light. Yet, Park J held 
that Section 164(6) had no element of creditor protection at all.”195 
 
He described R W Peak as a “high water mark”, which had been “eroded” by 
subsequent cases which, in the buyback context, resulted in an 
“enlargement of the role of the Duomatic principle”.196 McCahill J 
concluded that, in Dashfield, any breach of the buyback rules had been 
cured by application of the Principle, and thus distinguished R W Peak.  He 
stated: 
“I do not think it is possible to lay down a rule of universal 
application that s164 serves a particular public interest or the 
interests of creditors generally. It is necessary to consider each 
transaction and to examine that statutory provision and its 
underlying purpose in relation to that transaction. Thus, I do not 
believe that one can say that the Duomatic principle can never cure 
a non-compliance with s164.197 
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This adopts the normative application of the Principle discussed above. It is 
couched in negative language, and it would be neater in the positive – the 
buyback rules are mostly for the benefit of shareholders and therefore the 
Principle can apply to those. The rules that buybacks must be from 
distributable profits or be accompanied by solvency confirmations and that 
not all shares can be bought back are for the benefit of creditors and so the 
Principle cannot apply to them. McCahill J states: 
“However, it may not be hard to envisage situations in which s164 
would strike down a transaction… Such an example might be where, 
long after the directors had caused the company to buy its own 
shares using distributable profits, the directors sought retrospective 
ratification of that transaction by all the shareholders. In such a 
case, it may be the requirement of prior approval would render the 
transaction void.”198 
 
McCahill J compares this situation and Duomatic – in both cases, “money 
had left a company in disregard of those who were potentially prejudiced 
thereby”.199  This is confused, as the buyback rules require actual approval 
rather than information provided. Further, in line with the critique of the 
Duomatic decision noted above, it is posited that this is incorrect. If the 
Principle is capable of application then it should not matter whether 
permission for a transaction is prior or ex poste – if it is received from the 
correct people then the transaction should not be struck down. The 
difficulty of this approach is, of course, the effect on the transaction if the 
shareholders find out about it after completion and decide not to ratify it.  
This demonstrates that the Principle acts as a functional equivalent to 
formality but presents a risk to directors relying on it: they may be exposed 
if the shareholders chose not to ratify their actions. 
 
4.1.3. PURPOSE MAY CHANGE ACCORDING TO CONTEXT 
The purpose of the rule to which the Principle is purportedly applied is not 
the end of the matter. The interests of the company effectively equate to 
                                                     
198 Ibid para 130 
199 Ibid 
    65 
 
the interests of the shareholders,200 but when the company enters financial 
difficulties this changes to the interests of the creditors.201 Then, 
shareholders are unable to exercise their rights to direct the company, 
which only vest in them because the interest of the company aligns with 
theirs. Accordingly, the Principle cannot apply in financial difficulty.202 The 
precise point in time that such switch occurs is not clear. It does not require 
“technical insolvency”,203 and has even been stated to occur when the 
company is in “doubtful solvency or on the verge of insolvency”.204 This is a 
complex area - it is sufficient to note that the Principle can be stymied by 
financial difficulty of the company in question in line with the normative 
analysis reached above. 
 
Thus in Re: Finch (UK) plc205 the company entered insolvency. Prior, some 
complicated transactions appeared malfeasant – properties from a bare trust 
that one of the directors was settler of were transferred to the company in 
exchange for the issue of redeemable shares to such director, which were in 
turn immediately redeemed. The Chancery Division held that whilst the 
Principle could have ratified these wrongs, it could not do so whilst the 
company was insolvent. The purpose of the test is not conclusive for the 
Principle – it is necessary to review the financial strength of the company, 
and then in turn whether the Principle was invoked in fact. In addition, the 
redemption of shares amounted to a preference and therefore the 
transaction failed.  Stakeholders obtain protections of their claims against a 
company from outside corporate law: and these therefore interact with the 
Principle in practice. 
 
Most of the cases rejecting the Principle have concerned statutory 
procedures rather than provisions of articles.206 This is not surprising – the 
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articles are contracts agreed between, and capable of amendment by, the 
shareholders: the Principle should be able to apply to almost all of their 
provisions. Conversely, mandatory rules in company law often benefit third 
parties, and therefore there is a higher likelihood that the Principle will not 
be able to apply to them.  The Principle can apply to other rules, for 
example waiving formality in shareholders’ agreements207 and extraordinary 
general meetings of friendly societies.208 It also applies to classes of 
shareholders.209 
 
4.2. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRINCIPLE 
If the Principle is capable of applying to any given situation, it is necessary 
to evaluate whether it has, in fact, been implemented. There are two 
practical elements to this test: who needs to be involved, and what they 
need to do. 
 
4.2.1. WHO NEEDS TO BE INVOLVED? 
In the discussion so far, there has been a presumption of unanimity of the 
actors involved. For example, Lord Davey's dictum in Salomon referred to 
"every member" and "unanimous consent". The case of Joint receivers and 
managers of Niltan Carson Ltd v Hawthorne210 involved two parents 
establishing a company, which purchased and operated an unprofitable 
hotel. The mother (a director of the company) attempted to rent the hotel 
from the company for use as a children's home. All were content until the 
father realised how profitable the venture would be. He then obstructed the 
children's home business so that both the business of the children's home 
and the business of the company faced financial difficulties. The father 
procured his appointment as a receiver on behalf of the secured creditors, 
and raised an action against the mother, claiming that the profits of the 
children's' home business should belong to the company as the arrangement 
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was a substantial property transactions with directors of a company. 
Hodgson J characterised the father as follows: 
 
"He has a great taste for litigation, which he obviously enjoys. He is 
also, in my opinion, and I regret to have to say this, a man of few 
scruples and a man with a by no means comprehensive acquaintance 
with the truth. These characteristics have enabled him, both during 
the events out of which this litigation arises and during the extensive 
litigation that has followed them, to clothe what had its origins in a 
domestic dispute with the trappings and technicalities of corporate 
law. Like most domestic disputes, this one led to nothing but misery 
and sadness. It was composed of jealousy and hate, together be it 





"I should make it plain that I wholly accept Mrs Hawthorne [the 
mother] as a witness of truth, a finding that I regret I am unable to 
make as far as Mr Nelson [the father] is concerned. Wherever the two 
accounts differ, I unhesitatingly prefer and accept that of Mrs 
Hawthorne."212 
 
The mother's solicitors requisitioned a general meeting of the company to 
expressly permit the children's' home business to continue. The father, as 
managing director, summoned a deliberately (but only arguably) invalid 
shareholders meeting of the company at which 98.7% of the members 
attended. In respect of a roughly contemporaneous directors' meeting, 
Hodgson J commented "it well illustrated the depths of technical rubbish 
into which Mr Nelson had managed to drag his family",213 showing his 
attitude to the father. He took issue with the father's evidence and overly 
formalistic approach to corporate law. He held that shareholders' meeting 
valid and therefore any arguments about the Principle were irrelevant. 
However, he went on to state, obiter: 
 
"Mr Pendlebury [counsel for the mother] concedes that to apply the 
[P]rinciple thus enunciated to this case would be to extend it. He 
submits that, on the very special facts of this case, such an extension 
would be justified. First, because plainly Miss Boyd [the missing 
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shareholder] would have been quite unable to prevent a resolution 
being passed at a properly constituted meeting. She would have been 
as powerless as the preference shareholders in Re Duomatic. 
Secondly, because Miss Boyd was plainly in the pocket of Mr Nelson 
and, as she would do precisely what he told her to do, her 
independent voice would not have been heard at any meeting had 
she attended. I am impressed by this argument but, once again, in 
view of my decision on s48, I do not need to make a firm finding 
which would extend a principle of law perhaps more suitably 
considered in another Division. However, on the particular facts of 
this case, if I had to extend the [P]rinciple to the extent necessary to 
do justice in this case, I would do so."214  
 
The Principle was not required in this case and so this paragraph is, at most, 
obiter. Hodgson J limited this analysis to this specific case. In addition, 
neither of the arguments advanced by Mr Pendlebury enjoy judicial support. 
Emphasis on "justice", however, is highly illustrative to the judicial approach 
to the Principle. The flexibility of the Principle means that English courts 
can view it as almost a rule of equity, to overcome an unjust and overly 
formalistic application of corporate law. Whilst Niltan Carson shows the 
open-minded attitude that courts take towards the Principle, it is limited to 
its facts rather than of widespread application. That said, a court has held 
that the holders of 75% of the share capital may operate the Principle in a 
case where the remaining shareholder had been liquidated.215 This cannot 
be correct as the 25% shareholding must have passed to someone. However, 
this outcome helps demonstrate the flexibility of the Principle and the 
court's ability to invoke it whenever it feels that it is required to ensure a 
just outcome. 
 
Unanimity is easy easily analysed when legal and beneficial ownership in 
shares align, but in situations where there are beneficial owners which 
differ from the entities listed in the register of members of the company 
then the position becomes confused. In that situation, whose vote should be 
counted towards the Principle?  
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In Demite Ltd v Protec Health Ltd & Ors,216 receivers sold the business of a 
company to a company connected to a director, without the formal approval 
of the shareholders. The company in question (Demite Ltd) had been a joint 
venture between a Dr Shober and a Mr Webb Peploe, each using offshore 
holding vehicles. They fell out. The secured creditor of the company  
appointed receivers, who sold the business and assets of the company to an 
entity set up by the secured creditor and Mr Webb Peploe. There were 
arguments about whether the receivers were validly appointed and, if so, 
whether the sale was valid to a party connected to the director even though 
shareholder approval was not sought. An agreement between Dr Shober and 
Mr Webb Peploe acknowledged that a newco would be established to 
purchase Demite's business.  Park J held that this was insufficient to 
implement the Principle. He said: "My reason is that Dr Shober and Mr Webb 
Peploe, who signed the agreement, were not shareholders."217 He 
acknowledged that: 
 
"Offshore entities typically look for guidance to principal 
beneficiaries elsewhere (in this case the UK), and will usually go 
along with what the principal beneficiaries want. I am also aware 
that sometimes the beneficiary professes to act where theoretically 
the offshore entity should, and that in such cases the offshore entity 
is likely to acquiesce in and adopt what the beneficiary has done. In 
my judgment that does not mean that, in a case where the 
underlying assets of the offshore entity are shares, the shareholder 
is the beneficiary and not the offshore entity. Nor does it mean that 
in this case the signatures of Dr Shober and Mr Webb Peploe on the 
12 July 1996 agreement were the asset of Integro and Schroder Asia 




"the affidavits and exhibits do not clarify the exact relationship 
between the overseas shareholders and the domestic beneficiaries. 
Schroder Asia Nominees may hold its shares as a pure nominee for Mr 
Webb Peploe, but he has not said so in any of his affidavits. It seems 
fairly clear that Integro is not just a bare nominee for Dr Shober… 
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When shares are held by an offshore vehicle there is usually a reason 
for it, typically a fiscal one, and in other contexts the persons 
concerned are not slow to asset that the resident individuals, though 
beneficiaries, are not the owners of the shares. I am not prepared to 
take a different view in this case."219 
 
This is the correct decision for the wrong reasons. Formality in shareholder 
decision making is a default rule, designed to protect them from agency 
costs, which can be waived by them. Park J's analysis is, even that the two 
shareholders were bare trustees for the individuals, the Principle could not 
be invoked by the individuals. The Principle embodies the concept of 
ignoring formality to identify decisions of substance, in this case if the 
registered shareholders were bare trustees then the Principle should have 
been capable of being applied by the beneficial owner, as they were the 
entity entitled to make ultimate decisions of substance. However, the link 
between the registered shareholders and the individuals was never 
explored/clarified: this should block the implementation of the Principle. 
Park J's analysis was misdirected: beneficial ownership of shares should be 
the test for the Principle rather than the register of members. 
 
Deakin & Ors v Faulding & Ors220 involved a company (wholly owned by the 
Fauldings) paying bonuses (to the Deakins) informally on an incorrect belief 
that company law in some manner required equality between managers and 
shareholders.221 The company had two shares, one held by Peter Faulding 
(who managed the company) and one held by his mother, Nora (who "just 
went along" with her son).222 When Mr Faulding attempted to recover the 
bonuses from the Deakins (directors of the company) on the grounds of lack 
of shareholder approval, the Deakins invoked the Principle. When Faulding 
argued that the Principle could not be invoked because Nora had not 
consented, Hart J stated: 
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"We are concerned here with the application of the equitable rule 
that a fiduciary must not profit from his office without the consent 
of the corporators. Where a person (Peter Faulding) has an equity to 
compel a consent, I see no reason why equity should not have regard 
to the position of the beneficial as opposed to the legal owner in its 
application of the rule."223 
 
 
This analysis viewed the issue as one of equity – a beneficial owner can 
compel his nominee to act in a certain manner, and therefore the Principle 
should apply to beneficial owners. Hart J held that either Nora was holding 
her share as a bare trustee for Peter, or had delegated to Peter her 
authority in acting as a shareholder – in either event the Deakins were 
entitled to retain their bonuses. This is more coherent than Demite, but it 
remained unclear as to whether legal or beneficial owners (or indeed both) 
were required for the Principle to apply.  
 
The issue arose again in Domoney v Godinho & Others.224 In this case, 
Deakin v Faulding was contrasted with an Australian case, Jalmoon 
Proprietary Limited (in liquidation) v Bow225 which stated that the Principle 
only looked to the register of members. When reviewing the two 
interpretations, Lindsay J stated: 
 
"There are, indeed, further cases on the point and there may be 
some contest on the law, but if there is to be here contest on the 
law, it is one best dealt with on the basis of found fact rather than 
on the basis of assumptions and possibilities and uncertainties."226 
 
In Sahar v Tsitsekkos & Ors,227 Mann J reviewed the same authorities. When 
reviewing Deakin v Faulding, he stated: 
 
"It seems that Hart J was plainly prepared to accept that the consent 
of a beneficial owner of a share was sufficient for Duomatic 
purposes. In the passage I have cited he seems to treat the matter as 
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a question of principle – the beneficial owner (at least on the facts 
of his case) could have compelled the consent anyway so it was right 
to take that consent into account. However, it is also right to point 
out that part of his reasons seems to have been on an agency basis. 
The beneficial owner was argued to be acting as agent of the 




"It seems to me that the point of principle relied on by Mr Tager 
(namely that the Duomatic principle can never apply to the consent 
of a beneficial but non-registered shareholder) is not clearly right, 
and it should not be determined on a summary judgment application 
such as this. In fact my view is that as a statement of principle it is 
wrong. I do not see why in an appropriate case the principle should 
not operate in relation to the consent or informed participation of a 
beneficial owner of shares if the facts justify it. It may well be that 
the appropriate analysis is the agency argument – in many cases it 
will doubtless be possible to argue that a nominee shareholder has 
left all the real decisions to his beneficiary so that technically the 
consent of the beneficiary is the consent of the registered 
shareholder."229 
 
Mann J also avoided deciding the issue, instead stating that somehow this 
question of law  is a question of fact. This was not a neat conclusion. 
 
The issue was resolved in Re: Tulsesense Limited,230 which involved a 
company with 50% of the shares held by each of two branches of the family. 
The question was whether a director had been appointed by the 
shareholders via the Principle (in which case he remained a director) or by 
the board (in which case he did ceased to be a director at the next AGM). At 
the time of the putative application of the Principle, legal title to both 
shares was held by the father of the director – one in his own right, and one 
in his capacity as executor, with the beneficiaries being the other side of 
the family. The director argued that, as his father held the legal title to 
both shares, he could invoke the Principle. He further argued that, should 
that not be correct, then the assent of one of the beneficial owners would 
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suffice as multiple beneficial owners could compel the share to be 
transferred, jointly, into their own name, and if they did so then any one 
would be entitled to vote the share at a general meeting. Whilst Newey J 
appreciated the ingenuity of the argument, he rejected it, stating: 
 
"In the first place, in my judgment if an individual who holds some 
shares for himself and other shares as a trustee or executor has 
expressed assent, he is not to be taken to have given that assent in 
respect of the shares held as trustee or executor if he did not intend 
or purport to be making a decision in relation to those shares, at any 
rate if it would have been apparent to an observer that the assent 
was not intended to extend to the shares held as a trustee or 
executor. To take an example with similarities to the case before 
me, suppose that an individual who held one of a company's 100 
issued shares beneficially and 99 as a bare trustee concluded that a 
director should be appointed. The requirements of the Duomatic 
principle should not, without more, be taken to be satisfied were it 
evident that the shareholder had considered that it was for the 
beneficial owner of the 99 shares, and not for him, to make decisions 
as regards those shares."231 
 
This does not clearly answer the issue. However, Newey J's argument is 
important in the negative – it is not enough merely to be the registered 
owner of shares in order to implement the Principle. The legal shareholder's 
need to consider that any decision he makes benefits the beneficial owner 
should be seen in a broader light: whether a trustee legal shareholder can 
invoke the Principle depends on the constitution of the trust itself. If the 
trust authorises the trustee to exercise all rights, then the Principle may be 
invoked by him. Conversely, if the legal shareholder is acting merely as a 
bare nominee for a beneficial owner then they will not be able to invoke the 
Principle: the analysis shifts to the trust rather than onto mere legal 
ownership. By acknowledging that there is more to the analysis than mere 
legal ownership, Newey J provided a normatively correct result. He did, 
however, "assume, without deciding"232 that this was sufficient and 
therefore did not provide a clear ratio for  future application. 
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Newey J then reviewed whether the assent of merely one beneficial owner 
would suffice. He decided: 
 
"Whether or not, however, the assent of all of the beneficial owners 
of a share will suffice, I do not think that the assent of just one of a 
number of such owners normally will. First, while the beneficial 
owners of a share, acting together, might be able to require the 
share to be transferred to them (compare the rule in Saunders v 
Vautier (1841) Cr & Ph 240), no individual beneficial owner could do 
so. Further, even supposing that a share were transferred to its 
beneficial owners, with the result that they became joint holders, it 
would not necessarily follow that any of them could vote in respect 
of the share. As noted above, article 63 of the 1948 Table A provided 
for the vote of the "senior who tenders a vote" to be accepted. In the 
circumstances, it seems to me that, unless perhaps the legal owner 
of a share had entrusted decisions in respect of a share to just one of 
its beneficial owners, the assent of only one such owner cannot be 
enough for Duomatic purposes."233 
 
  
This follows the normative analysis. Unanimity reduces agency costs 
amongst shareholders. It would therefore be perverse if unanimity was 
required only between shareholders and not also between all of those who 
have a beneficial interest in the shares and have some form of decision 
making role in the trust.  
 
When someone holds a share other than entirely for themselves, it is 
necessary for them to actively consider the relevant matter in their capacity 
as trustee. It is not, however, necessary for shareholders of a company to 
consciously make a decision as shareholder. Re Conegrade Limited234 
concerned substantial property transactions approved at a board, rather 
than general, meeting. All shareholders were directors and all were present 
at the board meeting. Lloyd J stated:  
 
"I do not see why, at any rate where there has been a meeting 
attended by all those who were entitled to attend and vote at a 
general meeting and that meeting has considered the matter and has 
resolved, in terms, that the company shall enter into the particular 
transaction, the fact that the Minute is headed “Board Meeting” 
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rather than “General Meeting” and was not convened on the notice 
proper for a General Meeting and was attended by a Director who 
does not hold shares, should make it impossible to regard section 
320235 as having been satisfied."236 
 
Similarly, NBH Ltd v Hoare & Ors237 held that the approval to a substantial 
property transaction by a director who was also the sole shareholder of the 
company  was sufficient to implement the Principle. The judge in this case 
was Park J, who also adjudicated Demite, where he had expressed doubt as 
to whether the Principle was capable of application to this particular 
statutory requirement. Reviewing his earlier analysis of the same 
authorities, he decided in NBH that the Principle could apply to these 
provisions.238 He further concluded that the shareholder had, in some way, 
given their prior approval (which was required under the relevant section) 
and therefore the Principle was applied. This is consistent with Younger LJ's 
approach in Express Engineering. It also clarifies that, whilst trustees need 
to consider their capacity before applying the Principle, shareholders 
otherwise do not need to for the Principle to apply. This matches the 
theoretical position that would be expected: whilst trustees owe fiduciary 
duties to their beneficiaries, 'pure' shareholders do not owe fiduciary duties 
to other parties in the exercise of their vote. Third parties can have a 
legitimate interest in how control of the trust property is exercised (in this 
case the vote of the share), which is not present in respect of a 'pure' 
shareholder exercising their vote: in the former case, more than just a legal 
titleholder's needs to be taken into account whereas in the latter, only that 
whim is relevant. 
 
Where a decision only needs to be taken by one class of shareholders, the 
Principle can be implemented by that class alone. In Re Torvale Group Ltd, 
the consent of the holders of one class of share was required prior to the 
company granting a debenture. The Principle was applied on the basis of the 
informal consent of the sole holder of only the required holder of shares. 
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Accordingly it is also important to ascertain whose consent is required to a 
certain course of action and apply the Principle to that category of actors.  
 
4.2.2.  WHAT DO THEY NEED TO DO? 
It is necessary to review what the relevant shareholders must unanimously 
do. There are three elements of this: firstly, whether unanimity is required 
in all activities; secondly, how the agreement needs to manifest itself; and 
thirdly, how informed a shareholders' consent requires to be. 
 
Dealing with these in turn: 
 
(a) Constant Unanimity? 
Just because unanimity is necessary for the Principle does not mean that it 
is constantly required. Thus in In re Bailey, Hay & Co. Ltd,239 an invalid 
general meeting resolved to place the company into voluntary liquidation. 
All shareholders attended, even though some shareholders knew that the 
meeting was invalid. The resolution was passed by 50% of shareholders, with 
the other shareholders all abstaining. One abstaining shareholder 
subsequently raised proceedings as the meeting was invalid. Reviewing 
Express Engineering and Parker and Cooper, Brightman J concluded: 
 
"I consider that on the particular facts of this case all the 
corporators ought to be treated as having assented on December 9, 
1965 [the date of the invalid general meeting], to the company being 
wound up on that day. In my judgment, the case falls within the 
principle of the decisions in the two cases I have mentioned. 
Admittedly three of the five corporators did not vote in favour of 
the resolution, but they undoubtedly suffered it to be passed with 




"The conclusion is that they outwardly accepted the resolution to 
wind up as decisively as if they had positively voted in favour of it. If 
corporators attend a meeting without protest, stand by without 
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protest while their fellow-members purport to pass a resolution, 
permit all persons concerned to act for years on the basis that that 
resolution was duly passed and rule their own conduct on the basis 
that the resolution is an established fact, I think that it is idle for 
them to contend that they did not asset to the purported 
resolution."241 
 
There are two observations to be taken from this. Firstly, Brightman J 
viewed the abstaining members as being estopped from objecting to the 
resolution. This is a just result – if the now-objecting shareholders had voted 
against the meeting rather than abstained, then the resolution would have 
failed. Even if not, the shareholders would have made their objections to 
the course of action clear throughout the process. Secondly, it shows that 
the Principle operates on two distinct levels. Firstly, the procedural level – 
shareholders deciding whether to waive formality in respect of a particular 
question. Secondly, points of substance – the actual answer to the question 
raised. In the case of Bailey Hay¸ shareholders waived the formality 
requirements of the meeting. Having done so, they could not object to the 
substantial outcome of that informal meeting. It is difficult to envisage a 
situations whereby a shareholder agreed with the outcome of a decision, but 
objected to the manner in which it was made enough to try to overturn the 
underlying decision. Accordingly, if shareholders unanimously either accept 
informal processes, or agree on a point of substance, then the Principle can 
be held to apply. 
 
This point was appealed in Schofield v Schofield and Others,242 where, a 
father (Neil) and son (Lee) were directors of a company. The father's Belize 
holding entity held 99.9% of the shares and the son held 0.1% and was sole 
director. The father's offshore vehicle requisitioned a general meeting of 
the company to replace the son as a director. The company secretary 
convened an invalid meeting, the son voted against the motion. First 
instance held that the son had not in any way acquiesced to the invalid 
meeting and therefore the Principle cannot have been invoked. The father 
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appealed – as the son had submitted a motion to delay the meeting, he had 
acquiesced to the meeting and therefore any decision made by it. The Court 
of Appeal rejected this, holding: 
 
"What all the authorities show is that the Appellant must establish 
an agreement by Lee to treat the meeting as valid and effective, 
notwithstanding the lack of the required period of notice. Lee’s 
agreement could be express or by implication, verbal or by conduct, 
given at the time or later, but nothing short of unqualified 
agreement, objectively established, will suffice."243 
 
By attending the meeting in order to object to it and attempt to delay it, 
the son had not provided his consent to it. Instead: 
 
"Lee’s participation at the meeting was, therefore, conditional. His 
position throughout was that the  meeting had not been properly 
called, but, if and insofar as (contrary to his stated position) it was a 
valid meeting, he responded to the various proposals suggested by Mr 
Berry in the way that he did. That was not an agreement by Lee, as 
shareholder, to treat the meeting and the resolutions passed at the 
meeting as valid and effective. There was no objective agreement by 
him within the Duomatic principle."244 
 
This follows Bailey Hay. In Schofield, there was clearly no unanimity 
between shareholders in respect of the substantial outcome. Attending an 
invalid meeting to object to it taking place is not unanimity of process 
either. This analysis is straightforward for a shareholders' meeting, but more 
difficult in the context of a written resolution. For example, if an evidently 
flawed written resolution were circulated that a dissenting shareholder, 
noting its flaws, merely destroyed then such shareholder may be held to 
have acquiesced to the passing of the resolution. However, as a written 
resolution is passed by a requisite amount of the members as a whole rather 
than the requisite amount of those who respond,245 and Parliament 
explicitly stated that failures by directors to comply with the relevant 
section of the act will not invalidate any such resolution246 then these 
concerns are minimised. 
                                                     
243 Ibid para 32 
244 Ibid para 41 
245 Companies Act 2006 s296(4) 
246 Companies Act 2006 s291(7) 
    79 
 
 
This shows that, whilst unanimity in both substance and process is not 
required for the Principle to be held to apply,  one of the two is required for 
the Principle to be implemented. 
 
(b) Outward Manifestation 
To invoke the Principle, the shareholders must actually do something and 
outwardly manifest that action in some objectively verifiable way. In Re 
D'Jan of London Ltd,247 a company director, Mr D'Jan, signed an incorrect 
insurance form which invalidated the insurance of a premises. Liquidators 
raised an action against Mr D'Jan for misfeasance by way of negligence, and 
he argued that whilst the company was solvent its shareholders (he and his 
wife) would have ratified his misfeasance and so he was not liable. 
Hoffmann LJ (as he was then) held that this could not be the case: 
"Mr D'Jan did not realise that he had given a wrong answer until the 
insurance company repudiated. By that time the company was in 
liquidation. In my judgment the Multinational principle requires that 
the shareholders should have, whether formally or informally, 
mandated or ratified the act in question. It is not enough that they 
probably would have ratified if they had known or thought about it 
before the liquidation removed their power to do so."248 
 
This matches the normative position reached in respect of the Principle – 
the shareholders must apply it whilst they retain the residual rights in 
respect of a company. But what do they actually have to do? 
In Re Tulsesence Limited, Newey J stated: 
"I do not accept that a shareholder's mere internal decision can of 
itself constitute assent for Duomatic purposes. I was not referred to 
any authority in which it had been decided that a mere internal 
decision would suffice. Further, for a mere internal decision, 
unaccompanied by outward manifestation or acquiescence, to be 
enough would, as it seems to me, give rise to unacceptable 
uncertainty and, potentially, provide opportunities for abuse. A 
company may change hands or enter into an insolvency procedure; in 
either event, it is desirable that past decisions should be objectively 
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verifiable. In my judgment, there must be material from which an 
observer could discern or (as in the case of acquiescence) infer 
assent. The law applies an objective test in other contexts: for 
example, when determining whether a contract has been formed. An 
objective approach must, I think, also have a role with the Duomatic 
principle."249 
 
This requires some outward manifestation of the Principle, and has been 
quoted with approval in Schofield.250 In Re Home Treat Ltd,251 a company's 
objects did not permit it to carry out the business that the company had 
always carried out. Its administrators applied to the court to carry on this 
business, which would realise more for the creditors. Harman J stated: 
"That being so, it was thought right to make this application in order 
that the court might give a direction that the administrators do 
continue with that course of conduct. It is plainly in the interest of 
all the creditors, and probably in the interests of the shareholders 
and members of the company as well, since they have guaranteed 
the company's obligations under its mortgage to the bank over the 
nursing homes. It is obvious that the more that is realised by the 
administrators for the assets, which so far as charged will be payable 
to the mortgagee, the less call will be made on the members' 
guarantees. Thus a better realisation of the assets is to the 
advantage of the members even if there never comes to be enough 
money actually to pay out any money to contributories as members. 
 
Thus, the object of the application is plainly a beneficial one and if 
there be any way of allowing this order to go I should seek to make 
it."252 
 
As with so may cases reviewed in respect of the Principle, the court was 
keen to hold that the administrator was able to continue the business on 
some equitable grounds. It was suggested that the Principle may be invoked, 
but there was no evidence of assent. Harman J reviewed certain of the 
authorities and concluded that: 
 
"The decisions show that the law is that the consent of all members 
expressed together is as good as a special resolution. It is also clear 
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that acquiescence by shareholders with knowledge of the matter is 
as good as actual consent. In this case the silence of Mr Mahanan is, 
in my view, as good as acquiescence and establishes that he as much 
as his wife had assented by conduct to this change in the objects of 
the company."253 
 
Accordingly, as with Bailey Hay, acquiescence can, count towards assent for 
the purposes of the Principle.254 
 
However, it some form of objectively verifiable action or acquiescence 
appears necessary. 
 
(c) Informed Consent 
If inaction can trigger the Principle, how informed does the action or 
inaction have to be in order to qualify towards the Principle? In EIC Services 
& Ors v Phipps & Ors255 Neuberger J (as he then was) remarked: 
 
"If a director of a company informs shareholders of an intended 
action (or a past action) on the part of the directors, in 
circumstances in which neither the directors nor the shareholders 
are aware that the consent of the shareholders is required to that 
action, I do not think that it is right, at least without more, to 
conclude that the shareholders have assented to that action for 
Duomatic purposes. As a matter of both ordinary language and legal 
concept, it does not seem to me that, in such circumstances, it could 
be said that the shareholders have "assent[ed] to that action. The 
shareholders have simply been told about the action or intended 
action, on the basis that it is something which can be, and has been 
or will be, left to the directors to decide on, and no question of 
"assent" arises."256 
 
It insufficient for shareholders to know that the action is occurring, instead 
they need to know that their approval (even by acquiescence) of the matter 
is actively being sought. Neuberger J continued: 
 
"Before the Duomatic principle can be satisfied, the shareholders 
who are said to have assented or waived must have the appropriate 
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or "full" knowledge. If a shareholder is not even aware that his 
"assent" is being sought to the matter, let alone that the obtaining of 
his consent is at least a significant factor in relation to the matter, 
he cannot, in my view, have the necessary "full knowledge" to enable 
him to "assent", quite apart from the fact that I do not think he can 
be said to "assent" to the matter if he is merely told of it."257 
 
This matches the this thesis' analysis. Formality reduces agency costs 
between management and shareholders, and also between dominant and 
minority shareholders. Accordingly, if Neuberger's proposition were not the 
case, managers could swamp shareholders with excessive irrelevant 
information and rely on a lack of objection to invoke the Principle for some 
hidden matter. Following Bailey Hay, acquiescence (and, by extension, 
assent) should only count towards the Principle if the shareholders in 
question are fully informed of the matter and their need to assent. 
 
In Vinton & Another v Revenue and Customs,258 a tax commissioner had to 
decide whether an issue of shares was a mere subscription (which was tax 
disadvantageous) or a reorganisation (which was tax advantageous). The 
facts were confused– they intended to conduct the transaction in a tax 
advantageous way (and could have done), but a did not know how to do so. 
An attempt to invoke the Principle (as all shareholders wanted the 
transaction to be tax advantageous) failed, with the special commissioner 
stating: 
"I have considered carefully the Duomatic principle and I do not see 
that it can be applied to this case so as to give the character of a 
rights issue to what was expressed as a share subscription. It may be 
helpful in dealing with formalities that should have been complied 
with at the meeting but I do not see that it is capable…the fact that 
he suggests alternatives illustrates the level of confusion that exists 
since it is possible to imagine several ways in which varying degrees 
of IHT advantages could have been obtained and I do not think that 
Duomatic can be extended so that, out of a range of possible 
activities, the one that gives the more suitable IHT result is 
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selected… I do not think that the members of the group did 
understand the relevant facts. Accordingly I dismiss the appeal."259 
 
This demonstrates that the Principle requires unanimous consent to the 
specific action itself rather than vague agreement as to the ultimate desired 
result. 
 
The authorities seem to present a simple and unequivocal picture of how 
the Principle will work in practice: once it is established that the Principle 
can apply to a specific situation, it is necessary to see whether all entitled 
to decide the issue (as shareholder, beneficial owner or by operation of a 
trust or delegation) have indeed done so, then to establish whether they 
clearly, objectively and objectifiably did so in full knowledge of the facts 
and that their approval was required. However, within each area of analysis, 
there exists a grey area where the authorities often contradict, making it 
difficult to conclude that the roadmap outlined would always be followed. 
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5. NATURE OF THE PRINCIPLE 
Having reviewed the modern test we can discuss the nature of the Principle: 
firstly in practical terms, secondly to characterise its nature. 
 
5.1. PRACTICALITIES 
There are 2 aspects of practicalities of the Principle: the type of company 
and filing implications. 
 
5.1.1. TYPE OF COMPANY 
We have only seen 3 cases involving public companies and the 
Principle. Re Finch (UK) plc involved a plc with only two 
shareholders, Bairstow v Queens Moat Houses plc involved directors 
of a plc attempting to invoke the Principle in respect of decisions of 
the plc's subsidiaries (private) companies, and Re Torvale Group plc 
involved the discussion of the Principle in respect of one class of 
shares only, which were all held by one institutional investor in the 
company: the Principle has not, empirically and as judicially tested, 
concerned any Berle/Means Companies. Indeed, it has not concerned 
any companies whose shares were publicly traded. The Principle is 
likely to apply to close companies. 
 
Bainbridge's arguments for director primacy (as he acknowledges) are 
weaker for close companies. This is important for the Principle, as 
close companies are likely to have lower agency costs between 
shareholders (as a whole) and management. The Principle is only 
likely to be relevant in respect of agency costs between majority and 
minority shareholders and between shareholders and creditors. 
Requirements as to unanimity effectively solve the former, leaving 
interactions between shareholders and creditors as the relevant 
agency costs when considering the Principle. These are minimised by 
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the requirement that the Principle can only be invoked by the 
shareholders where the rule is for their benefit, and therefore 
prevents the shareholders from using the Principle to increase agency 
costs to creditors. Accordingly, where the shareholders are able and 
willing to take control of the actions of the company, they are not 
able to hide behind formality that they have ignored. The protections 
that shareholders have in a company are almost exclusively designed 
to protect them against self-dealing by management which is 
irrelevant if shareholder are taking a more active role than they 
would in a Berle/Means Company. 
 
Ultimately, the Principle embodies the ultimate extension of the 
Contractarian analysis: shareholders are able to vary the corporate 
contract. But this freedom that the shareholders have must have a 
counterbalance – following a variation from the default norm of 
management by the board, the shareholders should lose their 
protections of formality.  
 
5.1.2. FILING OBLIGATIONS? 
We have seen that the Principle can operate to change the 
constitution of a company. Whilst Cane v Jones side-stepped the 
issue, subsequent cases have clarified the issue (for example, in Re: 
Home Treat the Principle operated to amend the objects clause of 
the memorandum of association of the company). This makes logical 
sense – in Ho Tung v Man On Insurance Company Limited,260 Lord 
Davey opined that a special resolution was only "mere machinery for 
securing the assent of the shareholders, or a sufficient majority of 
them."261 The Principle is another procedure which can demonstrate 
the equivalent assent, and therefore should have the same effect. 
There are clear reasons for compelling any changes to a company's 
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constitution to be registered at Companies House,262 which currently 
applies to special resolutions of the company.263 The same analysis 
should apply to any equivalent change made by the Principle. 
Theoretically, the objective nature of the operation of the Principle 
should mean that there will be something to register, as one of the 
rationales given for requirements of objectivity is that: 
 
“the importance that an accurate record be kept of the true 
capitalisation of a company by its shares is such that it is not 
open to the members to waive compliance with this aspect of 
the requirements of s164 and s381A in reliance on the 
Duomatic Principle.”264 
 
If a special resolution is passed but not filed it does not affect the 
validity of the resolution, but an offence is committed by every 
officer of the company.265 A director, however, will always be aware 
of a special resolution: either this will be passed at a shareholders' 
meeting (which involves directors unless conducted via the 
Principle)266 or the written resolution procedure (which again involves 
directors unless conducted via the Principle).267 No equivalent 
requirement that a director be made aware of the operation of the 
Principle exists. Directors could be penalised by the Principle 
operating as equivalent to special resolutions. However, the courts 
have been keen to relieve innocent parties in this situation – for 
example the administrators in Re Home Treat. We have seen that the 
Principle is most commonly implemented where there is a close 
company with, frequently, commonality between directors and 
shareholders, which further reduces the risk posed by this line of 
argumentation. This possible liability on directors for the actions of 
shareholders could further encourage directors to diligence whether 
the shareholders have operated the Principle. Third party creditors 
are also protected from the lack of knowledge of any changes made 
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by the company so long as they are acting in good faith following the 
rule in Turquand's case.268 
 
5.2. LEGAL CHARACTERISATION 
This thesis identified a test for application of the Principle that 
appears universal and objective. However, on most issues there are 
conflicting cases and outcomes when it comes to the operation of the 
Principle.  
 
In Duomatic, directors of the company argued payments made to 
them should not be recovered by a liquidator due to the Principle. 
The court held that whilst this was correct from a decision making 
perspective, a preference shareholder was entitled to receive notice 
of the payments: failure to provide such made the payments 
recoverable. This conflicts with Re Torvale, where corporate 
approvals to the grant of security in accordance with the company's 
articles were not obtained, and the relevant shareholder could not 
remember consenting to the grant of security, although had no reason 
to think that they did not. If the Principle did not apply to Duomatic, 
then Re Torvale should have produced the same result. However, the 
analysis can be reconciled by viewing the Principle as a form of 
equity. Duomatic involved directors receiving ex gratia payments 
from the company, in Torvale the director funded the company and 
received security as a result. It therefore may be "just" that the 
underlying transaction of the former was rejected by the court whilst 
the latter was accepted. 
 
Torvale also does not sit comfortably with Re Finch or Re D'Jan.   In 
Finch, the court held that the shareholders had only consented after 
the company entered insolvency, after they lost their ability to direct 
the actions of the company. In D'Jan, the court held that the 
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shareholders (also the directors) would have ratified wrongs were 
they asked to do so, but had never done so.  If the Principle were an 
objective rule of law, these three cases should align: either evidence 
of shareholder consent is required, or it is not. The difference in 
outcome once more points to the flexibility of the Principle in 
achieving what the court believes is a fair outcome in the case as a 
whole.  Thus Deakin v Faulding can be differentiated from Duomatic 
on general equitable grounds: whilst both involved ex gratia 
payments made to directors, the court felt that this was a fair 
outcome in Deakin whereas it did not in Duomatic. The court will 
decide whether it should bless the transaction on a case-by-case 
basis, and use the Principle to do so: if it decides to not bless the 
transaction then it can utilise the technicalities of company law to 
strike it down, an approach first obliquely seen in Re Barry Artist. 
Niltan Carson is therefore less anomalous than thought: the court 
decided that one party should not be able to rely on technicalities of 
corporate law to challenge conduct by an equitably-innocent party, 
and used the Principle to bless the transaction. This is the ultimate 
heart of the Principle. 
 
The courts do not often expressly refer to equity in their discussion of 
the Principle. Whilst equitable remedies have been raised,269 and the 
background to a lot of the analysis concerns equitable concepts,270 
the only case which actively flags an equitable element to the 
Principle is EIC v Phipps, in which Neuberger J (as he then was) 
characterised the Principle as: 
 
"where the articles of a company require a course to be 
approved by a group of shareholders at a general meeting, 
that requirement can be avoided if all members of the group, 
being aware of the relevant facts, either give their approval 
to that course, or so conduct themselves as to make it 
inequitable for them to deny that they have given their 
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approval. Whether the approval is given in advance or after 
the event, whether it is characterised as agreement, 
ratification, waiver, or estoppel, and whether members of the 
group give their consent in different ways at different times, 
does not matter."271 
 
 
Given that we have seen that rules of equity under English law are 
those which provide a "gloss" on law to ensure its just application, it 
is difficult to conclude that the Principle is anything but a tool for a 
court to arrive at an equitable outcome. 
 
Elements of the modern Principle outlined in chapter 4 are only 
guidelines: the Principle is an option that the court can utilise if it 
wishes to let something remain valid despite inaccuracies in 
procedure. Viewing the Principle thus shows why the buyback cases 
reach contradictory positions: if the Principle were of universal, 
objective application then RW Peak and BDG Roof Bond would have 
concluded the same outcome as Kinlan v Crimmin and Dashfield v 
Davidson. The difference in outcomes is due to the Principle's role as 
an aid to the court to achieve a just result in the case. This applies to 
whether a beneficial owner of a share should be able to apply the 
Principle: if there was an objective, universal application of the 
Principle then there is no reason for the difference between Demite, 
Domoney and Jalmoon on one hand, and Deakin and Tulsesense on 
the other. Only by acknowledging that the Principle is a part of the 
court's discretionary powers to ensure just outcomes can all 
authorities be reconciled. Hence we can compare the strict approach 
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to shareholder approval taken in Finch and D'Jan with relaxed 
approach in Conegrade and NHB v Hoare: the former two cases 
involved wrongs by the directors, the latter two cases involved 
transactions which all sides acknowledged were for fair value.  
 
This approach is not surprising: calls to codify the Principle were 
rejected precisely to maintain its flexibility. However, the flexibility 
of the Principle undermines its normative certainty. We cannot be 
certain that the test outlined above will be followed by a court. This 
leads to a lack of certainty when applying the Principle. The 
normative conclusion reached at the beginning of this thesis is that 
the Principle should apply universally as shareholders should be able 
to informally conduct the business of the entity to which they retain 
residual rights and control over. The flexibility of the Principle 
undermines this. If the shareholders in RW Peak, BDG Roof Bond, 
Demite, Duomatic, Vintan v HMRC (and the other cases where the 
application of the Principle was rejected) had approved the relevant 
transactions through formal channels then they would have been 
valid. As it was, the court was able in each of those circumstances to 
reject application of the Principle either on the factual grounds of 
the case (which vary greatly) or on grounds that the Principle was not 
available to the specific technicalities of company law in question. By 
attempting to utilise informality, the corporate participants created a 
possibility whereby a court would look to the merits of the 
transaction to see whether they should use the  Principle, rather than 
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merely if the appropriate approval was received: as seen in Re Barry 
Artist. If shareholders attempt to rely upon the Principle then the 
merits of their decisions will be analysed by the court: but not 
expressly and overtly. the courts hide the equity and fairness analysis 
behind a veil of formal compliance with the Principle. Thus judicial 
analysis has concentrated on whether or not the Principle can apply 
rather than the just nature of its application: even if this involves 
creative differentiation from otherwise analogous case. This risks 
making shareholders believe the Principle is of objective and 
universal application when it is not. This juridification of the court's 
ability to look at the underlying merits of the transaction from the 
company's perspective is pernicious: by hiding behind technical 
analysis, the court is hiding what it is really doing in cases purporting 
argue the Principle.  
 
5.3. NATURE OF THE PRINCIPLE 
Grantham calls the Principle outdated. He thinks the Principle harks 
back to a Victorian view that the shareholders retain control over the 
activities of the company, which they do not under modern company 
law.272 For Grantham, the Principle confuses divisions between 
directors and shareholders. Watts disagrees as it remains open to 
shareholders to amend their articles to assume management of the 
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company.273 It is respectfully submitted that both miss the point. We 
have seen that normatively, Grantham's view is incorrect. Further, 
the cases have been concerned with decision making by shareholders: 
when ascertaining whether the shareholders have properly approved 
a transaction. The primary exception been in respect of the activities 
of directors: whether shareholders ratified their wrongs. The 
Principle has applied to decision making by the company, but not 
actions undertaken by the company: it has only arisen in 
circumstances where action of directors has been challenged due to 
infelicities of internal procedure, and has not arisen because 
shareholders have undertaken action directly. The question is mostly 
whether shareholders approved the action, not whether the 
shareholders have undertaken the action themselves. Seen this way, 
the Principle can be viewed as an aspect of the rule in Turquand: a 
good faith third party is entitled to assume that the company has 
complied with its own internal procedure. Given the flexibility of the 
Principle outlined above, however, this is merely one facet of the 
Principle that can be displayed in a particular case. 
 
Ellis has described the Principle as being "a principle without form", 
noting that despite the lack of codification under the Companies Act 
2006: 
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"the fact that many of the procedural formalities which 
existed under the previous Companies Act still remain under 
the 2006 Act (even for private companies) indicates that 
Parliament still considers formal procedures to have 
significant worth. As such, the tension between compliance 
and waiver still remains and the courts are still being asked to 
make distinctions between adherence to statute and “justice” 
if the circumstances demand it. 
 
It is submitted that these tensions should be resolved. 
However, a suitable solution may be difficult to come by. 
Codification of the principle may fail to bring about any true 
certainty and it is arguable that this would only perpetuate 
the current situation. 
 
Perhaps, instead, it is time for the principle to be abolished 
(despite the views of the Company Law Review). A less drastic 
approach would be to limit its application to lack of 
compliance with the articles. This would, at least, be a 
virtuous circle. Alternatively, if the courts are capable of 
treating certain statutory provisions as otiose in certain 
situations, why is it not possible to do the same through 
legislation?"274 
 
This analysis accepts and acknowledges the flexibility of the 
Principle, but proposes that it be limited to only items under the 
articles. The halfway house proposed by Ellis is unsatisfactory, as it 
acknowledges that aspects of the articles should be waivable by the 
shareholders, but refuses to apply this principle to any provision of 
statute that exists (however explicitly) for their benefit. It would be 
a resource-intensive exercise to provide an exhaustive list of areas of 
application of the Principle, which would quickly become outdated. 
Despite the downsides the flexibility of the Principle, it may be 
better that such flexibility exists, so long as shareholders are clear 
that utilising informality will risk a court examining the merits of the 
specific proposed transaction in a manner which could be avoided by 
merely undertaking activities formality. 
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When it comes to Australian law, Meagher JA held that the essence of 
the Principle was one of waiver.275 On the other hand, Ford's 
Principles provides 3 views of the Principle: the limited view (that 
shareholders can meet without the proper notice requirements), a 
wider view (that the Principle is a form of equitable estoppel) and an 
even broader view (that the Principle involves the lifting of the veil 
of incorporation, with the shareholders binding the company).276  
Ford's Principles avoids a general conclusion for the reason that the 
Principle can be held by the court to be any of the 3, depending on 
the context. Ultimately, the legislature and the courts have 
maintained the flexibility for the Principle to be waiver, estoppel, 
agreement, ratification, or any other formulation of this wording, 
depending on the circumstances. This flexibility makes the Principle 
difficult for study, as it is not certain that satisfying the guidelines 
identified will ensure that a court holds the Principle as applying. The 
court's ability to decide the Principle's application differently in 
analogous circumstances, provides its practical strength and 
normative weakness. It would be easier if courts began 
acknowledging the Principle's role as a tool to achieve an equitable 
end. The Principle is, therefore, not an embodiment of a 
Contractarian position, Shareholder Primacy or even Director 
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6. CONCLUSION 
The Principle has firm theoretical groundings in economic examinations of 
the historical and modern company: Contractarian analysis provides for it to 
be applied strongly. It has been present and implicit in company law ever 
since Salomon. Its theory and history can be reliably traced through the case 
law to the modern day. It is even possible to establish workable guidelines 
to establish when it is likely that it will be applied. The way to do this is 
firstly to establish whether the relevant rule exists for the benefit of the 
shareholders. If it does, then the next step is to ascertain whether the right 
people gave the correct level of consent in an objectively verifiable enough 
manner. 
 
Yet this analysis cannot definitively predict a court's attitude in any given 
circumstance. Closer examination of the discrepancies between cases on the 
same subject area leads to the unsatisfactory conclusion that courts decide 
whether to apply the Principle depending on how just the outcome of doing 
so would be, rather than strictly applying the legal tests to the factual 
matrix. There are two primary issues with this approach. Firstly, this thesis 
commenced its analysis by normatively concluding that there are certain 
circumstances in which the shareholders of the company should be able to 
invoke the Principle. The court's approach conflicts with this normative 
position. Whilst the Principle remains in its current form, shareholders 
would be better advised to utilise prescribed formality for transactions as 
that will prevent a court from subsequently analysing its merits. This 
undermines their ability to rely on the Principle, and makes it fit less neatly 
into the Contractarian normative framework of modern company law. 
 
The second issue is more serious. The nature of the Principle (being an ex 
post blessing of a transaction which was effected informally should the 
circumstances make the court feel it is just to do so) is currently hidden. 
Courts apply a textual analysis of the authorities on the Principle, despite 
its flexibility providing maximum discretion to the court, encouraging 
participants in corporate life consider the Principle a right the shareholders 
    96 
 
have, rather than a court's ratification of an informally approved transaction 
after the fact on the transaction's merits. The current textbook treatment 
of the Principle mischaracterises it as being invokable by shareholders: 
instead it remains a purely judicial remedy to overcome potential 
invalidities in otherwise valid transactions. This mischaracterisation is not in 
the interests of students of corporate law or shareholders.  
 
This thesis' reluctant conclusion, therefore, is that despite the normative 
analysis suggesting maximum opportunity for informality at the options of 
shareholders, despite a historic chain of cases that purport to provide a 
strong lineage and consistency to the Principle, and despite a body of case 
law that provides an apparent set of  guidelines for the Principle's 
application: if shareholders want certainty that a court will not seek to re-
open the merits of transactions which require their approval then they 
should undertake this through prescribed formal means and avoid 
attempting to rely on the Principle. The Principle instead remains a tool for 
an English court to achieve an equitable outcome: given that we have seen 
that Scots law does not contain a concept of "equity", it can only be a 
matter of speculation as to how a Scottish court can utilise the Principle.277 
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